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ABSTRACT 
Malawi’s agricultural sector has remained the mainstay of Malawi’s economy since 
independence.   Ironically, agricultural production and productivity are observantly below 50% 
of their respective potentials. This is partly explained by low lending levels towards the 
agricultural sector by financial institutions. However, just as elsewhere, commercial banks in 
Malawi are under international obligations of ensuring financial stability by undertaking liquidity 
management framework and measures. One such liquidity management intervention is the 
liquidity reserve requirements (LRR).  This study departed on the theoretical understanding that 
quantitative tightening through LRR affects the liquidity position (and funding needs) of the 
banking system which consequently affect lending levels towards the economy (Alper et al., 2016) 
and by induction, the agricultural sector. It is on these premises that this study sought to examine 
the impact of liquidity on agricultural lending levels in Malawi. The study employed secondary 
data from 6 commercial banks that have been in operation in the opted data period of between 
2007 and 2017. Besides estimating total liquidity creation, three sets of relations were tested: the 
impact of LRR on Total Liquidity Creation (TLC); the impact of liquidity levels on Agricultural 
Lending Levels (ALL); and, the determinants of Total Credit (TC) in Malawi. To test the 
relationship between liquidity and lending the Malawian Banking sector, the study adopted the 
panel regression framework while fixed effects and random effects models were using in the 
estimations. The control variables included bank capital, bank asset growth, bank deposit growth 
and loan to deposit ratio. From the empirical analysis, the study shows that banks created liquidity 
of about 1.2% of total industry assets over the study period. For the period under observation, 
LRR positively affected TLC. Similarly, the impact of liquidity levels on ALL was positive. In 
general, TC was positively determined by Bank Deposit Growth and Loan Deposit ratios while 
LRR, TLC and Bank Capital affected TC negatively. This could imply that an increase in TLC does 
not automatically result into an increase of TC.  The findings further indicate that LRR had a 
negative effect on ALL.  In periods where LRR went up, ALL  went down,  possibly implying that 
banks shift to other sectors considered less risky even amidst rising liquidity levels.   
 
. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Since independence in 1964 until the present, the agricultural sector has remained the mainstay of 
Malawi’s economy.  As commented by African Institute of Corporate Citizenship (2017:1), “about 
80% of the national employment comes from agriculture, making it not only an important 
springboard for any industrial efforts in Malawi but currently also the key source for the country’s 
economic development”. Ironically, “despite the majority being employed in the agriculture sector, 
only 40% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – estimated at US$ 4.05 billion – comes from 
agriculture” (Economics Association of Malawi, 2018:3). This is so “because the yields for the 
main crops have always been below 50% of the potential levels” (AICC, 2017:1). The “main 
reasons for low productivity include the small landholding size which discourages the adoption of 
agricultural productivity-enhancing technologies as well as the erosion of soil fertility” (Chipeta, 
2004:4). However, of utmost impact is limited access to agricultural finance by both smallholder 
and large scale farmers. “Beyond government's patches of direct intervention in agricultural 
lending, financial institutions' (commercial banks in particular) total lending towards the sector 
has been hovering around eight and twelve percent for the past 30 years” (AICC, 2017:4).  The 
low lending levels towards the sector is largely attributed to the “risk nature of agriculture 
enterprises especially farming” (Bankers Association of Malawi, 2017:12).  
 
On the other hand, commercial banks in Malawi and elsewhere, are under international obligations 
of ensuring financial stability by undertaking stringent capital and liquidity management. One such 
stringent capital and liquidity management intervention is the “systematic avoidance of highly 
risky loans such as agricultural loans” (Kalua, 2016:4). The liquidity reserve requirement (LRR) 
is “one such key financial framework which provided for the capital and liquidity management of 
commercial banks in Malawi” (BAM: 14).  The primary motive for LRR is to ensure that liquidity 
risk is well managed. Specifically, LRR is considered as a preferable modality of managing 
liquidity risk due to a number of reasons. Firstly, it ensures that cash is maintained in advance 
which should save on liquidation costs (Alper et al., 2016). Secondly, as commented by Calomirisi 
et al (2012: 1) cash is observable and verifiable; and thirdly, “because the risk of cash is invariant 
to bankers’ decisions about whether to invest resources in risk management”.  Calomiris et al 
(2012: 1) further argue that the primary benefits derived from LRR relate to “improvements in 
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bank risk profiles and incentives towards risk during normal times and the consequences of those 
behaviours for reducing probability of a liquidity crisis making banking systems more resilient 
from a default risk perspective”. However, different studies have generally confirmed that 
quantitative tightening through reserve requirements affect the liquidity position (and funding 
needs) of the banking system which consequently affect lending levels towards the economy 
(Alper et al., 2016, Calomiris, 2012). It is on these premises that this study sought to examine the 
impact of LRR on agricultural lending levels in Malawi. 
1.2 Statement of Research Problem 
As observed by (Calomiris et al., 2012: 4) “after the heavy reliance of banks on central bank 
lending during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, policy makers understandably would like to reduce 
the dependence of banks on the lender of last resort”, and “thus encourage banks to limit or self-
ensure (through cash asset holding) some of their liquidity risk”. Minimum capital and liquidity 
reserve requirements are some of the modalities of ensuring that the dependence level on central 
bank as lender of last resort is minimized. Through LRR in particular, “a liquidity crisis in the 
economy is assumed to be reduced since the banks do not become weak enough to the extent of 
making their risk unimaginable” (Medina & Roldos, 2014:14). In addition, “the reaction of many 
economies to the recent surging capital inflow has been to keep policy rates at low levels in order 
to avoid excessive appreciation of the domestic currencies while engaging in macro prudential 
tightening to curb the rapid credit growth” (Calomirsis et al., 2012:5). The LRR has therefore been 
one of the most popular tools among unconventional monetary instruments (Medina & Roldos 
2014). Most central banks—over 90 percent—oblige “depository institutions (commercial banks) 
to hold minimum reserves against their liabilities, predominantly in the form of balances at the 
central bank” (Gray, 2011: 65). The LRR is based on the belief that “banks with liquid assets and 
stable funding structures can effectively maintain their intermediation capacity amidst external 
negative economic shocks” (Medina & Roldos, 2014:14). As observed by Kalua (2016:56), “this 
ultimately builds a foundation for sustainable economic growth”.   
 
The Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) periodically issues liquidity reserve directives whose 
objective is to use the LRR as “instrument of monetary policy while at the same ensuring flexibility 
in liquidity management” (RBM, 2017: 9). The LRR is observed in relation (or as a portion of) 
total deposit liabilities and other liabilities. Just in many countries, the LRR measure in Malawi is 
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implemented as a prudential measure, monetary control measure and liquidity management system 
(Gray, 2011).  The latest 2015 directive has specific provisions for minimum LRR, deadlines for 
meeting LRR, penalty for non-compliance, use of funds for LRR and computation of LRR among 
other clauses. Presently, the LRR is 7.5% (of total deposits liabilites) which is expected to be 
observed as a minimum on daily basis.  The link between LRR and credit growth in an economy 
has been a subject of vigorous research in the field of Banking and Finance (Kashyap & Stein: 
2000; Kishan & Opiela, 2000, Alper et al., 2016). Gray (2011:56) confirms that “numerous studies 
have confirmed a direct impact of the increase or decrease in LRR on credit growth”. While some 
literature has confirmed bank liquidity as a factor that weakens the effectiveness of the traditional 
bank lending channel (Kashyap & Stein: 2000; Kishan & Opiela, 2000), others have considered 
liquidity requirement as a factor that enhances loan issuance (Cornett et al., 2011).  The middle 
ground on the impact of liquidity requirement on bank lending is provided by Alper et al (2016: 
12) who argue that “final effect of liquidity requirement on lending levels is dependent on the 
transmission mechanism of LRR on lending levels”. Depending on the assumptions around the 
substitutability of bank fund and bank deposits, the transmission mechanisms of LRR on lending 
levels are categorized into three channels namely: costs, interest rate risk and liquidity channels 
(Alper et al., 2016). Under cost channel, an increase in LRR ultimately leaves lending levels 
unchanged while under interest rate risk channel, an increase in LRR reduces loans (Alper, et al., 
2016). The same applies for liquidity channel. Consequently, the “final impact of liquidity 
requirement on lending levels depend on the relative strength of the three channels” (Alper et al., 
2016:13).  
 
Liquidity creation remains one of the core roles of financial institutions (besides risk 
transformation). However, given that liquidity requirement impact bank’s liquidity creation and 
therefore lending ability (whether positively or negatively), it should follow that RBM’s LRR has 
some effect on commercial banks’ lending levels to the private sector. Whether the effect on total 
lending level or credit is the same on the agricultural sector or not was the core focus of this study. 
Specifically, the study aimed at analysing the impact of liquidity on agricultural lending levels in 
Malawi. The proposed study departed on three sets of relationship as confirmed by literature: i) 
LRR has an impact on total liquidity creation; ii) total liquidity has an impact on total credit or 
lending levels (agriculture inclusive); iii) total credit has an impact on agricultural lending levels.    
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1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1 Main Objective 
In view of the above, the main objective of the study was to analyse the impact of LRR on 
agricultural lending levels in Malawi between 2007 and 2017.   
1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
To achieve the above objective, the following specific objectives were pursued: 
i. To estimate the Total Liquidity Creation in Malawi. 
ii. To examine the impact of Liquidity Reserve Requirement on Total Liquidity 
Creation. 
iii. To analyse the impact of liquidity on total credit and agricultural Lending Levels 
in Malawi. 
1.4 Justification of the Study 
Although LRR have been implemented in many countries so far, the focus in many studies as 
observed by Horvarth et al (2012) has largely been on its impact on general lending levels across 
all sectors. There “has been little emphasis on the impact towards agricultural lending as compared 
to other economic sectors of the world” (Horvarth et al., 2012:4). It is imperative that an extra 
attention is given to agricultural sector not only in Malawi but also other Sub-Saharan countries 
that are largely dependent on agriculture and are at policy level baffled by low lending levels 
towards the agriculture sector. 
 
Secondly, while the challenge of agriculture credit and finance has been extensively covered in 
literature, the focus has largely been on “other structural causes such as disorganized farmer 
groups, unpredictable weather patterns, price volatility of agriculture commodities and excessive 
controls by government in both import and export markets” (Mlinde, 2016: 23). There is scarcity 
of studies on the role of bank capital and liquidity on agriculture lending. 
 
Thirdly, at the centre of Basel II capital requirement is the recognition that a “strong and resilient 
banking system is the foundation for sustainable economic growth since banks provide credit 
intermediation” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2003: 5). Thus the accord is intended 
to “ensure both banks' solvency and liquidity creation” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
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2003: 5).   Given the multiple literature findings that confirm the possible reverse causality of 
liquidity and bank's solvency caused by Basel II capital requirement, it is critical that a special 
focus is given to the impact being created on lending levels towards countries' strategic sectors - 
agriculture in the case of Malawi especially at a time LRR is strictly being applied as a compliance 
to the Basel II. 
1.5 Definition of Key Terms 
The study frequently used a number of terms. To ensure proper localization of the study it is 
important that contextual definitions are provided at the onset. Some of the key terms used include 
in this study are bank capital, liquidity, liquidity creation, liquidity risk and maturity 
transformation. 
 
Bank Capital as used in this study means the equity of the bank that serves as the “cushion needed 
to absorb any unreserved losses that the bank incurs thereby enabling the bank to operate as a 
going concern and thus avoiding the insolvency or bankruptcy during periods of market correction 
or economic downturn” (Gambacorta & Mistrulli, 2004:17). Regulatory capital therefore “is the 
minimum threshold levels required by regulators to protect against bank insolvency as well as to 
protect against losses to the deposits made by depositors “(Diamond & Rajan, 2000:43). Failure 
“to maintain capital above regulatory thresholds leads to penalties and possibly bank closure”. 
(Diamond & Rajan, 2000:43).  “Regulatory capital thus runs contrary to economic capital which 
is an optimal level of capital that maximizes shareholder value in the absence of the regulatory 
requirements” (Gambacorta & Mistrulli, 2004:17). 
 
Liquidity: while the general concept of liquidity implies the ability of an organization to make 
payments as they fall due, in banking realm, “liquidity implies the possibility or easiness of 
converting assets into cash without serious loss of time or money” (Whittlesey, 1945: 1). It 
therefore connotes the extent "relative to the volume and character of liabilities to which the bank 
holds assets that are either in form of cash or readily convertible into cash without material loss" 
(Whittlesey, 1945: 1). Liquidity creation therefore is “the process by which banks transform liquid 
liabilities to illiquid assets” (Horvath et al., 2012). It indirectly determines the bank's ability to 
create loans.  
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Liquidity risk as used in this thesis means the risk that a “solvent bank (or financial institution) 
may find itself unable to manage its current flow of withdrawals from its own stock of liquidity 
and access to borrowed funds from others” (RBM 2017:3).  
 
Liquidity reserves means the “eligible assets held by a depository institution for the purpose of 
satisfying the liquidity reserve requirement” (RBM 2017: 3).  
 
Liquidity reserve requirement on the other hand is a “constraint imposed on all intermediaries 
(often in percentage or ratio form) that specifies the lower bound on the share of a short asset in 
the intermediary’s portfolio” (Farhi, et al., 2009:974). The regulator (central banks usually) do not 
need to “observe individual contracts signed by different agents with intermediaries but can only 
observe the aggregate portfolio allocation” (Farhi, et al., 2009:974).  
 
Maturity transformation is a “process whereby assets are financed with liabilities of a shorter 
maturity” (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993: 29).  The banks’ gains are twofold namely, a reword for 
bearing interest risk and a reward for the creation of liquidity.  
 
Liquidity creation implies a process through which financial institutions create liquidity through 
among other channels, deposits, off-balance sheet guarantees, derivatives and other balance sheet 
and off-balance sheet financial activities (Berger & Sedunov, 2016). Liquidity creation is therefore 
in essence also a measure of financial intermediaries’ outputs.  
1.6 Organization of the Study 
The proposed study will be organized along five chapters as tentatively indicated below: 
• Chapter 1: Introduction and Background: this chapter provide an introduction and background 
to the study. The problem statement, research objectives for the study and study chapter outline 
of chapter.  
• Chapter 2: Literature Review: as a way of contextualising the impact of LRR on agriculture 
lending, this chapter undertake a literature review of empirical findings on the nexus between 
several variables namely LRR and total liquidity creation, total liquidity creation and total credit 
or lending levels as well as total credit and agriculture lending levels. The literature review is 
premised on the theoretical presentation on the role of financial institutions on lending process 
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as well as modalities in which lending processes are made possible. 
• Chapter 3: Methodology: this chapter provide a detailed explanation of the research design, 
sources of data, types of data, data collection instruments, data analysis techniques and 
hypothesis testing techniques.  
• Chapter 4: Discussion of Results: this chapter present and give an analysis of results based on 
the three specific objectives along the outcomes of hypotheses testing. 
• Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations: in this chapter a summary of study findings in 
line with the study's objective is provided. It draws implications and tentative generalisations 
on the impact of LRR on agriculture lending in Malawi. General recommendations along each 
of the major finding as they relate to development finance is provided.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents both Malawi’s banking system and agricultural landscape overviews. It 
presents two sets of theories: theories of financial intermediation and theory of bank liquidity. The 
first set aims at contextualizing the role of financial intermediaries and the mechanism through 
which the roles are discharged. The second set partly stems from the first set but goes further to 
discuss why and how liquidity reserve requirement is implemented by the financial intermediaries. 
After a theoretical background, an analysis of literature along the study objectives is presented. It 
is the literature review in this chapter that informed model for analysis of data (in chapter 3).  
2.2 Contextual Overviews 
2.2.1. Financial Institutions and Intermediary Services Landscape in Malawi 
Just as in many developing countries, “commercial banking system in Malawi forms most vital 
component of the financial sector responsible for accepting deposits and granting short-term credit 
to productive entities” (Mlinde, 2016: 34). The Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) is the core of the 
formal financial system responsible for ensuring the financial system’s soundness (Reserve Bank 
of Malawi, 2016). In Malawi, “the financial sector’s ability to grow and serve more markets is 
inhibited by key factors including high real rates of interest and uncertainty generated by 
macroeconomic instability” (IMF, 2015: 15). The financial sector in Malawi has nine commercial 
banks (providing savings, lending and other investment products) on top of other financial 
institutions namely National Bank of Malawi, Standard Bank, NBS Bank, First Merchant Bank, 
Ned Bank, Eco Bank, CDH Investment Bank, New Finance Bank, FDH Bank. Table 1 below 
presents a consolidated summary of total assets, credit and concentration levels.  
Table 1: Summary of Banks’ Total Assets, Loans and Advances 
2017 MALAWI KWACHA (MILLION 
TOTAL ASSETS    1,572,300.00 
LOANS AND ADVANCES        414,163.64 
TOTAL DEPOSITS        995,500.00 
 Source: 2017 Malawi Financial Stability Annual Report  
 
In terms of concentration levels, Agriculture came top with 22.3% in 2017 as shown in the Table 
2 below although the preceding 10 years had agriculture on fifth position consistently.  
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Table 2: Lending Concentration Levels (2017) 
Sector K’ MILLION % 
Agriculture      97,358.3 22.03 
Mining and Quarrying       1,102.0 0.25 
Manufacturing     72,439.7 16.4 
Electricity, water and gas     10,638.1 2.4 
Construction and civil engineering      15,278.6 3.5 
Wholesale and retail trade   103,889.9 23.5 
Transport, storage and communication     26,069.3 5.9 
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services     20,001.3 4.5 
Community, social and personal services     46,613.8 10.6 
Other sectors     28,341.05 6.4 
Total   441,934.7 100 
 
Source: 2017 RBM Financial and Economic Review 
 
Private sector involvement in the financial sector, “including the entry of new players, has 
increased with financial liberalization measures” (BAM, 2017:2). Two banks, National Bank of 
Malawi and Standard Bank, dominate the sector with 58 percent of the sector’s assets, and 59 
percent of its deposits (IMF, 2015: 5). The first foreign shareholders entered the market in 1994 
following banking sector reforms. Majority of foreign controlled banks own over 46% of total 
assets in the sector, with most foreign owned investors entering the market through investments in 
new companies (RBM, 2016: 6). In recent years, other private firms including NBS, Leasing and 
Finance Company have expanded operations.  
 
Around “95% of the total credit from the financial institutions is provided by the commercial 
banks, making their role in economic growth significantly critical” (RBM, 2017:5). In Malawi, 
Government Treasury Bills offer high real rates of return which consequently encourage their 
purchase. In addition to fiscal and monetary policies, “lack of competition in the banking sector 
has contributed to wide spreads between lending and borrowing rates (upwards of 20 percent) for 
the past five years” (IMF 2015:6). For example, minimum and maximum nominal lending rates of 
the two largest banks varied from 46 to 52 percent while the average nominal savings rate was 26 
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percent, representing a spread of 20 to 26 points in the past four years (Kalua 2016). It is in view 
of these dynamics that the banking sector in Malawi appears profitable with an average gross profit 
growth of 80 percent for the two major banks (Burritt, 2006).  
 
Consequently, as commented by Kalua (2016: 18) “the high appetite by commercial banks to lend 
towards government's high deficits has continuously created disincentives towards private sector 
lending and for the development of the financial system in general”. For example, out of 78 percent 
of total credit by commercial banks, only 35 percent has been extended to private sector between 
2005 and 2014 (IMF 2015). The very high rates of return to Treasury Bills “discourages banks 
from lending to the private sector besides discouraging banks from competing with each other to 
attract clients with services and competitive pricing that translates into lower real rates of interest 
for clients” (Kalua, 2016: 19).  
 
The major casualty of low credit levels to private sector has been agriculture. AICC (2017: 23) 
estimates that “the average lending towards the sector has been consistently below 12% for the 
past 10 years”. There are at least four major reasons that possibly explain this outcome. Firstly, 
Commercial banks consider lending to the agricultural sector as a risky investment and prefers to 
lend to non-farm sectors (Malawi Government, 2017).  “Product markets and input markets for 
agricultural growth are still functioning poorly” while with “respect to product markets, most 
smallholder farmers are poorly organized and lack of bargaining power over pricing of produce” 
(AICC, 2016:14). As a result, transaction costs remain high due to low traded volumes of 
agricultural produce and lack of agriculture financing (Malawi National Agricultural Policy, 
2017). Secondly, consistently high levels of interest rate increase non-repayment levels of loans 
by both farmers and other agricultural value chain players (ECAMA, 2018). Interest rates on loans 
in Malawi are far higher than in the other countries in the Southern African Development 
Community region (IMF, 2015). Thirdly, commercial banks in Malawi “are biased towards urban 
areas and town centers thereby denying the service to the agricultural value chain activities which 
are predominantly undertaken in the rural areas by rural dwellers” (Malawi Government, 2017:32) 
Finally, with poorly defined land rights in Malawi, “the ability of rural farmers to offer collateral 
to commercial banks as a condition for accessing credit is greatly hampered” (AICC, 2016:21). 
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However, although Malawi’s literature on Bank lending does not confirm the effect of Liquidity 
Reserve Requirement (LRR) on lending levels, evidence elsewhere shows its effect on general 
lending levels. In Malawi, the LRR set Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) through Monetary Policy 
Committee remained constant from 2009 to 2014 at 15% which was revised and reduced to 7.5% 
as shown by Figure 6 below.   
Figure 1 : Liquidity Reserve Requirement Trend for Malawi Banks 
 
Source: Own Depiction from RBM Data 
2.2.2 Malawi's Agricultural Landscape 
Although agriculture is Malawi's backbone, the irony is that “175 inhabitants occupy one square 
kilometre of arable land, putting Malawi as one of most densely populated countries in Africa” 
(IMF 2015:3). Ironic also is the fact that, despite having one short rainy season (of four to five 
months), farming is predominantly rain-fed. Within the agriculture sector, there are limited 
products, with maize dominating and grown by about 80% of smallholder farmers (AICC, 2016). 
The main exports are consequently agricultural raw materials. Tobacco continues to be the main 
export (which alone contributes over 65% of the value of exports) followed by tea and sugar, along 
with a range of other food crops (AICC, 2016) – despite the international anti-smoking campaign. 
Evidently but not surprising, “the sector suffers from myriad challenges ranging from weather 
conditions, small landholding size and fragmentation, low markets access and value addition 
besides access to finance” (Malawi Government, 2017: 4). These factors as commented by Mlinde 
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(2016: 32) “account for sub-optimal yield of 50% below the potential levels in all agricultural 
value chains”.  
2.2.2.1 Evolution of Agricultural Lending in Malawi 
During the colonial era, the Malawi Government provided farm credit “as part of colonial 
economic policy that promoted commercial production to supply the colonial administration” 
(Mawaya, 1994: 14). Agricultural credit under the colonial regime targeted large-scale commercial 
farmer’s especially political leaders. This approach of farm credit, as commented by Kalua, (2016: 
5) “neglected rural small-scale farm production and influenced post-independence rural credit 
policies”. This was the outcome, because after independence, “the government adopted this 
approach although the clientele was broadened based on a master farmer approach (Kalua, 2016: 
5).  However, due to high rate of default, “government failed to recover the loans it gave out to, 
hence made a decision of granting credit to large indigenous farmers” (Chirwa, 1995: 5). In late 
1970s, farm credit was extended to small-scale farmers based on group lending approach with 
constraint to it.  For a group to access the credit, it was required to deposit 10 percent of the 
requirement upfront as part of the contractual agreement. This scheme was consolidated into the 
smallholder agricultural credit administration (SACA) in the year of 1985/86 growing season 
(Kalua, 2016). 
The credit division with the Ministry of Agriculture was transformed into the Smallholder 
Agriculture Credit Administration (SACA) was a department of the Ministry of agriculture that 
provided seasonal agricultural loans to smallholder farmers. (AICC, 2016) The project was 
introduced to support the country’s efforts to promote food security and expansion and 
diversification of smallholder production (Malawi Government, 2017). Smallholder families were 
anticipated to benefit from the increased crop production resulting from improved farm technology 
applied with the use of credit and extension (Kalua, 2016). SACA was providing credit to 
smallholder farmers. In its initial years it was able to meet its operating costs from its income 
(Kalua, 2016). This program was unsustainable because throughout the year of its operation, it 
faced administrative and operation burdens which resulted in the substantial financial losses 
(AICC, 2016).  During implementation of SACA, the repayment performance was impressive with 
repayment rate of 79 percent in the years between 1985 and 1990 (Kalua, 2016). This performance 
was disrupted by political instability in 1991 season that led to the transition to multiparty 
democracy and subsequent drought that destroyed crops in 1991 bringing in difficulties in loan 
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repayments and economic recession which led to the collapse of SACA (Malawi Government, 
1990).  
Another well-known program was by Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), this was a 
creation of the Malawi Government with funding from World Bank following the collapse of 
SACA. Since 1994, MRFC inherited the operations of SACA, its portfolio was giving loans to the 
state, besides that, MRFC’s target clientele was smallholder farmer’s organized into joint liability 
credit groups of 5 to 10 members (AICC, 2016). MRFC mostly provides seasonal agricultural 
loans for seed, fertilizer and pesticides for the crops. It also offered short-term and medium term 
loans for farm equipment (Malawi Government, 1990). 
Malawi Mudzi Fund (MMF) was another initiative which was introduced in the agriculture sector. 
This was a pilot credit and savings scheme, it was a separate World Bank funded agricultural credit 
project and also supported SACA (Kalua, 2016). MMF was supported by the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The pilot scheme visualized a program to the rural poor 
following certain aspects of the Banglash Grameen Bank approach (Malawi Government, 1995). 
MMF operated as a separate legal entity from SACA and commenced its functions in June 1990, 
a year behind schedule due to delays in positioning its staff and lack of coordination between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of Malawi regarding the opening of a special account 
(World Bank 2000).  At the beginning of the pilot, MMF was offering cheap credit to its 
beneficiaries and the program was sustained through the funds from donors. It was later discovered 
that in order to eliminate the subsidy, MMF was supposed to charge normal interest rates unlike 
what was charged (Chirwa, 1998). According to Hulme and Mosley (1996) there is evidence of 
positive association between access to credit and increase in income due to Malawi Mudzi Fund. 
For example, the increase in income participants in the MMF credit program average percentage 
of the average income change of the control group was 117% (Hulme & Mosley, 1996: 21). On 
the other hand, the increase in participant’s income were higher at 9.1% in families above the 
poverty line compared to a decline among families below the poverty line (Hulme & Mosley, 1996: 
21). 
Warehousing receipt has been another venture of agriculture financing.  Malawi’s first pubic 
warehouse receipt was issued at GSL silos in Kanengo, Lilongwe. The Agriculture Commodity 
Exchange for Africa (ACE) and Grain Traders and Processors Association (GTPA) implemented 
  
22 
 
the system. The Agricultural Commodity Exchange for Africa (ACE) has advocated for a 
Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) as an integral part of agricultural trade and financing since its 
incorporation in 2005 (ACE, 2011). ACE grain deposits are in turn backed by a warehouse receipt 
which can immediately be financed by a bank. This provides “buyers an opportunity to purchase 
more grain of a known quality and quantity, whilst at the same time providing the depositor the 
prospect of accessing funds to meet immediate needs, and at the same time, keeping ownership of 
the grain” (AICC, 2016: 27). A number of donors, common fund for commodities, EU, AGRA 
and USAID are funding diverse components of the system, ranging from software development, 
rural warehouse restoration, trainings, linking farmers and actual implementation. However, 
Malawi does not have a regulatory framework for warehouse receipts (WRs) so the system has to 
be built on contractual relationships between grain depositors, storage operators, financial 
institutions and ACE.   
Over the last 10 years, development partners, NGOs and private sector players progressively 
recognized value chain as the key lens through which they understand farming, processing and 
distribution to consumption markets for a particular agricultural commodity. It is for that view, 
that the agricultural interventions by development partners, NGOs and private-sector players 
increasingly use (at least partially) the value chain approach and seek to facilitate the improved 
functioning of value chains (USAID 2007. In value chain approach, improving access to finance 
along the value chain is now recognized as essential component. However, Agricultural value 
chains collectively have needs and challenges that surpass the needs of particular actor, some of 
which can be met or alleviated in part by improving access to financial services.  
Presently, the occurrence of lending for agriculture is well below the share of the sector as a 
percentage of GDP.  Table 3 below show sector’s share of GDP and Domestic private credit 
between 2000 and 2016.  
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Table 3 : Sectoral Share of GDP against credit concentration (2000 -2016 Averages) 
SECTOR SHARE OF 
GDP (%) 
SECTOR LENDING 
(%) 
AGRICULTURE 36.0 11.0 
TRADE 14.0 11.8 
MANUFACTURING 8.0 9.7 
TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATION 6.8 14.8 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 6.4 10.2 
CONSTRUCTION 4.6 4.2 
REAL ESTATE 4.1 11.4 
HOTEL AND FOOD 1.7 4.2 
UTILITIES 1.5 19.9 
MINING 0.9 10.5 
OTHERS 19.1 23.9 
Source:  Own compilation from RBM Economic and Financial Statements 
 
Table 1, shows that only 11% of lending goes to agriculture, even though it accounts for around 
36% of GDP and being the highest contributor to the GDP.  In Malawi, “the agriculture sector 
employs 87% of the labour force, creates 36% of GDP (54% including distribution), and 90% of 
exports” (AICC 2017: 5). Smallholders dominate agricultural production and their share of total 
production relative to estate farms is growing (Kalua, 2016). Despite agriculture’s prominence in 
the economy, commercial bank advances in the sector has significantly fluctuated in the period 
under study with most banks registering a similar declining and increasing trend as shown Figure 
2 below.   
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Figure 2 : Agriculture Lending Levels for 6 Banks in Malawi 
 
Source: Authors Own Depiction Banks Balance Sheets and RBM 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework: Lending Behaviour and Mechanisms of Financial Institutions 
Understanding how LRR affect lending levels would require putting into perspective how and why 
lending institutions discharge their roles. With regard to the “how” lending institutions discharge 
their duties, Finance and Banking literature generally provides four key financial processes which 
are relevant to the understanding this role. These are financial mobilization, intermediation, 
maturity transformation, risk transfer and financial deepening and repression. Mobilization in 
finance is mainly concerned with “moving surplus funds form savers to those who have the need 
for funds but do not have them” (Kalua, 2016:32).  Put differently, financial mobilization ensure 
that surplus funds are attracted from savers and are put into productive use (through investment 
lending). Intermediation on the other hand happens when “an individual, institution or market 
sources funds and then issues a claim against itself: the claim eventually end up as liabilities on 
the balance sheet” (Kalua, 2016:33). The claims that the supplier of funds acquires from the user 
of the funds appear as asset on the intermediary’s balance sheet. In this way, the intermediate 
serves as the link between those with loanable funds (savers) and user who do not have funds of 
their own (borrowers) but have investment opportunities. Maturity transformation helps “banks to 
borrow short term money and invest in long term duration projects: (Qi, 1998: 198). Banks by their 
very nature are best placed to be efficient in maturity transformation since they are able to raise 
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money through deposit mobilization (Jaffee & Modigliani, 1969). The fact that financial 
institutions have a large number of lenders or depositors reduces the risk of an expected upsurge 
in withdrawals (Qi, 1998). With regard to risk transfer, a bank “ensures a fair distribution of 
inherent risk and returns through taking one or two guarantees or through taking an equity stake 
in a given project” (Jaffee & Modigliani, 1969: 851). Finally, financial deepening occurs when 
“the rate at which financial assets are accumulated is faster than the rate at which non-financial 
assets are accumulated” (Qi, 1998: 200). In the case of financial repression, government controls 
the cost of borrowing.  
 
All the above processes are therefore relevant to the understanding of bank lending processes. 
However, the intermediation role remains cardinal to the lending processes of the banks. Two 
theories of financial intermediation will therefore be examined in this study. With regard to why 
banks decide to or not to lend, bank liquidity reserve requirement and credit rationing are of 
cardinal importance in understanding the lending patter of banks. The theories of liquidity reserve 
requirement and credit rationing will therefore be examined below.  
2.3.1 Modern Financial Intermediary Theory  
The Modern Financial Intermediary Theory (MFIT) is built on the notion around the reasons for 
the existence of intermediaries. MTIF uses the foundations of modern theory of finance which has 
three pillars namely: optimality, arbitrate, and equilibrium (Scholtens & van Wensveen, 2003). 
Optimality refers to the “notion that investors aim at optimal returns while arbitrage implies that 
the same assets has the same price in each single period in the absence of restriction” (Scholtens 
& van Wensveen, 2003: 34). Equilibrium implies that markets are cleared by price adjustment –
through arbitrage – at each moment in time. In the perfect market for capital or Arrow-Debreu 
world, as observed by   Calomirisi and Kahn (1991: 42), the following criteria usually must be 
met: 
- “No individual party on the market can influence price” 
- “Conditions for borrowing/lending are equal for all parties under equal circumstances” 
- “There are no discriminatory taxes” 
- “Absence of scale and scope economies” 
- “All financial titles are homogeneous, divisible and tradable” 
- “There are no information costs, no transaction and no insolvency costs” 
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- All market parties have ex ante and ex post immediate and “full information on all factors 
and events relevant for the (future) value of the traded financial instruments”.  
 
In the Arrow-Debreu market, “savers and investors find each other because they have perfect 
information on each other’s preferences at no cost in order to exchange savings against readily 
available financial instruments” (Qi, 1998: 204). In addition, the supply of capital is sufficiently 
“diversified so as to provide the possibility of full risk diversification, courtesy of complete 
information and homogeneous expectations on market parties” (Calomirisi &Kahn, 1991: 42) 
 
Qi, (1998: 201) argues however that as “as long as the above factors do not hold and there are 
deviations from this perfect world, intermediation will creep in to exploit the situation”. 
Intermediaries will creep in to bring savers and investors together and to create instruments that 
meet their needs. According to MTIF, “financial intermediaries are active because market 
imperfections prevent savers and investors form trading directly with each other in an optimal 
way” (Diamond & Dybvig , 1983: 45).  MTIF argues that that there are three avenues or opening 
under which financial intermediation is made possible. These modes are in principle the core 
reasons for the existence of financial intermediaries. These are information problems (asymmetry), 
transaction costs and regulatory factors. 
 
From an asymmetric information argument, “ex ante asymmetries (which lead adverse selection 
challenge), interim asymmetries (which cause moral hazard) and ex post asymmetries (which result 
into auditing and costly state verification and enforcement) jointly create market imperfections 
which results into some (transaction) costs” (Calomirisi & Kahn, 1991: 42).   Financial 
intermediaries partly overcome these costs since they act as “coalition of depositor that provide 
household with insurance against idiosyncratic shocks that affect their liquidity position” 
(Diamond & Dybvig , 1983: 45) Besides acting as coalition of depositors, banks also act 
information sharing coalitions as well as “delegated monitors on behalf of ultimate savers” (Qi, 
1998:200). In case of” households that do not turn to intermediated finance but prefer direct 
finance, there is a still a brokerage role for financial intermediaries such as investment banks” 
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 45). Here the reputation effect is also at stake. In financing, “the 
reputation of the borrower and that of the financial are relevant” (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 45).  
Information asymmetry studies focus on bank-transaction based lending and lender relation. In 
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transaction-based lending “class information that is relatively available at the time of loan 
origination is used while in relationship lending, data gathered over the course of the relationship 
with the borrower is used’ (Qi, 1998:204).  
 
Under the transaction approach, the assumption of complete markets are not contradicted. The 
approach is based on the “non-convexities in transaction technologies” (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 
45). Here the financial intermediaries act as “coalition of individual lenders or borrowers who 
exploit economies of scale or scope in the transaction technology” (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 
45). The notion of transaction costs here is not restricted to monetary costs but also search costs, 
monitoring and auditing.  Here the role of financial intermediaries is “to transform particular 
financial claims into other types of claims consequently offering liquidity” (Qi, 1998:200). Thus 
unlike in the information asymmetry approach, the reason for existence of financial intermediaries 
under transaction costs approach is exogenous.  
 
The third approach focuses on financial intermediaries’ existence from the angle of regulation on 
money production as well as savings in the financing of the economy. It is argued that regulation 
affects solvency and liquidity with the financial institution. The activities of intermediaries 
inherently “ask for regulation”. This is so because “the banks by the way of their activities are 
inherently insolvent and illiquid” (Diamond & Dybvig , 1983: 45). 
 
Despite the general usefulness of MTIF, there are inherent weakness that render its usefulness 
limited. Its inherent weakness stems from the fact that relies so much neoclassical concept of 
perfect competition (Qi, 1998). Three key flaws are conspicuous. Firstly, “in view of the 
liberalized and deregulated financial market, advancement in information technology, 
communication revolution as well as instant availability of important macroeconomic data and 
monetary data in real time on the global level, the theory would imply that financial intermediaries 
are becoming superfluous” (Qi, 1998: 204). However, evidence in the real world shows that their 
economic importance is higher than ever and appears to be increasing (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). 
 
Secondly, as others have observed, it is increasingly becoming evident that the “main determinant 
of the relative size of the country’s financial system is the separation of the funct ions of savings 
and investing among different economic units” (Qi, 1998: 205). Tremendous theoretical and 
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empirical studies find that a well-developed financial system is beneficial to the economy as a 
whole (Jaffee & Modilglian, 1969). Financial intermediation affects economic growth by acting 
on the saving rate – a fraction that goes towards productivity and investment (Qi, 1998). Besides 
determining the level of investments and savings, financial intermediation increases efficiency in 
the allocation of financial funds in the economic system.  
 
Finally, even in the case where there is “evident substitution of bank held assets (loans) by 
securitized assets held by the public” (equity and bonds for example), this cannot be seen as a sign 
of “disintermediation process” (Qi, 1998: 205). In practice, banks are increasingly becoming 
essential in the processes of securitized instruments as they initiate, arrange and underwrite the 
floating of these instruments (Jaffee &Modilglian 1969).  
2.3.2 Amended Financial Intermediation Theory 
The amended financial intermediation theory (AFIT) departs on premise that in the “real world, 
financial intermediaries do not consider themselves agents who mediate between savers and 
investors by procuring information on investors to savers and by selecting and monitoring 
investors on behalf of savers” (Calomirisi & Kahn, 1991: 14). AFIT argues that this is not the job 
of financial intermediaries. Instead, they mainly deal in money and risk. Thus it is risk and risk 
management that drives value creation on the part of banks. “The nature of value added by 
financial intermediaries through financial instruments are not created by savers and investors 
themselves (individually) by rather by financial intermediary intensified by the competition in the 
market place between existing financial institutions and new entrants which strongly stimulates 
innovation of new financial products in order to compensate for profit erosion on existing standard 
products” (Qi, 1998: 200). AFIT argues that although risk management has become a key area of 
intermediation activity, MTIF has offered little to explain why institutions should perform this 
function. AFIT argues that under MTIF, risk appears as a negatively operating factor or peripheral. 
It is considered to result in adverse selection, credit rationing and moral hazard “yet the absorption 
of risk is the function that bridges a mismatch between the supply of savings and demand for 
investments as savers are on average more risk averse than investors” (Qi, 1998: 201). Thus risk 
(maturity, counterparty, market, life expectancy and income) is the core business of financial 
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industry. Financial intermediaries can absorb risk on the scale required by the market because their 
scale so1.  
 
AFIT argues that even with perfect information, “the time and risk preferences of savers and 
investors fail to be matched completely by the price (interest rate) mechanism thus it is the financial 
intermediary that has to with these missing links by managing risks in order to allow for the 
activities of other types of households within the economy” (Qi, 1998:201). It is argued that 
financial intermediaries diversify risk and exploit economies of scale especially when investors 
want to invest in firms. In such a scenario, “research, legal and organization costs associated with 
such investments can be prohibitive for a single investor but an intermediary can perform these 
tasks for a group of investors, thereby lowering the cost per investor” (Qi, 1998: 201). 
 
AFIT does not deny the pivotal role information plays in financial intermediation process. On the 
contrary, “under the strong influence of modern communication technologies and of the world 
wide liberalization of financial services, the character of financial intermediation process is 
changing rapidly” (Qi, 1998:202). This has consequently caused a decrease in traditional form of 
financial intermediation, (on-balance sheet banking) and fastened the pace and intensity of 
counterpart of financial intermediation (capital markets where savers and investors deal in 
marketable securities) (Calomirisi & Kahn, 1991). AFIT argues that “capital market processes 
would be unthinkable in the absence of financial intermediaries’ bridging of difference risk 
preferences of market parties by means of derivatives” (Qi, 1998: 203). In summary, AFIT and 
MTIF have the following differences as shown by Table 4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 It is important to note that although information asymmetry includes risk, risk involves more than uncertainty by a 
lack of complete information. Risk refers to a chance that of unpredictable emergencies for both contracting parties. 
In other words, not asymmetric distribution of information but no secure information at all even with perfect ad hoc 
information on both sides, on future events I the at the heart of financial business.  
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Table 4 : (Stylized) Contemporary and Amended Theory of Financial Intermediation 
MTIF AFIT 
Static: Perfect market differentiation Dynamic: market Development; market 
Market imperfections development Product innovation and market 
Financial intermediary is an agent 
between savers and investors, monitors 
loans on behalf of depositors 
Financial intermediary is an 
entrepreneurial provider of financial 
services 
Efficient allocation of savings Qualitative asset information; risk 
transformation 
Transaction costs Value creation 
Asymmetric information Customer orientation, both to real 
investors and savers 
Adverse selection, moral hazard, credit 
rationing, auditing 
Risk Management, risk/reward 
optimization 
Regulation as market imperfection Regulation for institutional and systematic 
risk control 
Disintermediation Dynamics of intermediation (new markets, 
new products, new agents) 
Source: Calomirisi & Kahn, 1991: 45 
2.3.3 Theory of Bank Liquidity Requirements 
The theory of bank liquidity requirements (TBLR) is grounded on the “rightfulness or 
appropriateness of cash requirement (reserves) as compared to capital for prudential regulation”   
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 65). It presents three justifications for cash holding as a prudential 
regulatory framework: i) “maintaining cash in advance saves on liquidation costs”; ii) “cash is 
observable and verifiable” (while measuring capita requires a valuation of the loan portfolio, 
measuring cash does not) and iii) “because the riskiness of cash is invariant to bankers’ decisions 
about whether to invest resources in risk management, greater cash holdings improve incentives 
to manage risk in the non-cash asset portfolio of risky assets held by the bank” (Qi, 1998: 2005)  
TBLR presents three scenarios under which liquidity reserves are equally necessary. The first 
scenario is “stand-alone autarkic banking equilibrium where cash is held voluntarily by banks as 
a commitment device to manage risk properly” (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 66). Under this 
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scenario, increasing cash holdings response to adverse news stems from depositors’ incentives to 
withdraw funds (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Thus although there is no regulation of liquidity in 
this scenario, voluntary choice of liquidity reserve level is important. The second scenario is where 
there are multiple banks. Under this scenario, there is diversified risk. The “coalition of banks will 
commit to lend each other funds in response to ban-specific needs to accumulate cash. In that 
equilibrium, cash requirement will be imposed by the group to prevent free riding on efficient 
interbank liquidity assistance and cash requirements will be less than cash holdings voluntarily 
held in the autarkic equilibrium”  (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983:67). The third scenario has a 
government deposit insurance. In this set-up, “cash holding will be set higher than under either the 
autarkic or multiple bank equilibrium since in the presence of deposit insurance, higher cash 
requirements are necessary to prevent moral hazard and ensure proper risk management”  
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 67). TBLR argues that beyond insurance role, “liquidity requirements 
encourage good risk management making the banking system more resilient from a default risk 
perspective” (Qi, 1998: 2005). It argues further “that not only does cash mitigate the liquidity risks 
attendant to exogenous shocks, it also mitigates endogenous default risk” (Qi, 1998: 2005) 
 
Just like MFIT, the starting point for TBLR is a perfect market scenario where there are no 
transaction or information costs. This is called Black-Scholes-Merton framework. In this 
framework, “all information that can be known is known equally to all parties and all securities 
are equally liquid and can therefore be sold for their true value without incurring liquidation costs” 
(Qi, 1998:203). In that set-up, the only special feature of cash is that it has no risk. From the 
“standpoint of prudential regulation, greater cash holding and greater reliance on equity finance 
each reduce default risk of the bank” (Qi, 1998: 203). More cash assets under this set up reduces 
asset risk while more equity reduces default risk for any given level of asset risk. Thus cash and 
equity (bank capital) under this framework are two alternative ways of reducing default risk. Given 
that the prudential goal of controlling default risk can be achieved through different combinations 
of the two, there is no optimal combination of cash-to-asset ratio and equity-to-asset ratio (Qi, 
1998). 
 
However, when the Black-Scholes-Merton assumptions are relaxed, the effects of cash and equity 
on default risk are not the same.  For example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) found that the physical 
costs of liquidation make liquidity risk costly which could motivate the holding of inventories of 
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liquid assets. As further observed by Calomirisi and Kahn (1991) depositors also receive noisy and 
independent signals about risky portfolio outcome of the bank. Thus by holding reserves, banks 
insulate themselves against the liquidity risk of a small number of misinformed early withdrawals 
in states of the world where the outcome is actually good.  Without those reserves, “banks offering 
demandable debt contract would unnecessarily subject themselves to physical liquidation costs 
when they fail to meet depositors’ requests for early withdrawal” (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983: 68). 
Since equity is undesirable means of controlling risk because of the hg costs of raising equity, cash 
holding is regarded as desirable because it is cost effective in reducing default risk (Qi, 1998).  
3.2.4 Theory of Credit Rationing 
Credit Rationing (CR) broadly “refers to any situation in which lenders are unwilling to advance 
additional funds to a borrower even at a higher interest rate” (Mlinde, 2016: 78).  Jaffee and 
Modilglian, 1969: 850-851) define CR as a situation “in which the demand for commercial loans 
exceeds the supply of these loans at the commercial loan rate quoted by the banks”. By implication, 
changes in the interest rate cannot be used to clear excess demand for loans in the market which 
entails that CR is a supply-side phenomenon with the lender’s supply function becoming perfectly 
inelastic at some point. Thus, as observed by Jaffee and Modilglian (1969: 851), credit rationing 
occurs in circumstances where either: 
a) “Among loan applicants who appear to be identical some receive a loan and others do not 
and the rejected applicants would not receive a loan even if they offered to pay a higher 
interest rate”; or, 
b) “There are different identifiable groups of individuals in the population who with a given 
supply of credit are unable to obtain loans at any interest rate, even though with a larger 
supply of credit, they would”. 
Practically, the above implies two situations. Firstly, the “one in which increases in the interest 
rate cannot clear excess demand in the loan market, whether this excess demand reflects a single 
borrower who would like a larger loan amount or any” (Kalua, 2016: 56). The second one as 
presented by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), is where some borrowers are completely rationed out of 
the market, even though they would be willing to pay an interest rate higher than prevailing in the 
market. 
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The interest in CR has always emanates from the “role it plays in transmitting the macroeconomic 
effects of monetary policy on the economy and its role in explaining the development and 
underdevelopment of financial institutions in developing countries”  (Munnell et al., 1996:12). 
Interest in CR also emanates from its ability to explain bank fragility, especially bank-runs. Seen 
from this perspective, CR happens in a reversed way since customers decide on the quantity of 
deposits (to leave or give to banks) regardless of price of the deposit (Munnell et al., 1996). Finally, 
interest in CR has largely increased due to increasing interest in different loan denial rates across 
different groups. (Munnell et al., 1996).  
 
As observed from Scott (1957: 45), the earliest discussion on CR viewed it as a “non-equilibrium 
phenomenon arising either because of exogenous interest rate rigidities or because of a lack of 
competition in the loan market”. Soon after Scott’s (1957) analysis, subsequent authors made a 
distinction between temporary CR (where market interest rates are slow to adjust to exogenous 
shocks such as changes in the lenders costs of funds or borrower demand) and equilibrium CR 
(which persists after the market has fully adjusted to these shocks.  Of the two, equilibrium CR 
has been hard to explain. Hodgman (1960), was the first to explain it under what he called rational 
equilibrium framework. Under this framework, “lenders evaluate potential borrowers on the basis 
of the loan’s expected return-expected loss ratio” (Hodgman, 1960: 23). It further assumes that 
“there is maximum repayment that the borrower can credibly promise, which effectively limits 
how much the lender will offer the borrower regardless of interest rate” and  eventually the 
expected losses become too great relative to the expected return” (Mlinde, 2016: 81). Miller (1962) 
tried to beef-up Hodgman (1960) analysis by arguing that Hodgman’s analysis could be made 
consistent with rational expectation between the borrower and lender by incorporating bankruptcy 
costs that would be incurred by the lender upon the borrowers’ default. Freimer and Gordon (1965) 
resolved Hodgman’s (1960) and Miller’s (1962) analyses by showing that CR can occur with a 
risk-neutral lender if the borrower has a fixed-sized funding need. This was done with the 
assumption of an exogenous interest rate.  Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) completed the picture by 
endogenozing the equilibrium interest rate by modelling both the supply and demand sides of the 
market.  
 
From the modern perspective, while Akerlof’s (1970) article on adverse selection partly explained 
CR, it was Jaffee and Russell (1976) who provided an expected asymmetric information rationale 
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for CR in general sense. In their model, “lenders cannot distinguish ex-ante between high and low 
quality borrowers” (Jaffee & Russell (1976:19). Seen from this perspective, “low quality 
borrowers must accept the contract that is preferred by the high-quality borrowers, lest they be 
identified as deadbeats they are”. (Jaffee & Russell, 1976: 43).However, although a market 
clearing interest rate-loan amount combination does exist, high quality borrowers prefer a contract 
that entails CR. In this model however, the equilibrium is not stable. 
 
Five years later in 1981, Stiglizt and Weiss published the canonical model of CR where contract 
choices with a stable equilibrium were endogenized. In Stiglitz –Weiss (1981: 22) framework, CR 
“occurs because the lenders expected return is not monotonically increasing in the interest rate”. 
Instead, adverse selection and moral hazard problems eventually “cause the lender’s expected 
return to decline as the interest rate rises” (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981:45).  In the adverse selection 
model, “borrowers and lenders are both risk neutral. Borrowers are characterized by their projects 
which are assumed to have the same expected returns but differ from another in their risk” 
(Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970: 45). The borrower projects differ on the basis of mean-preserving 
spreads (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970). These projects are “also assumed to require a fixed 
investment and borrowers have a fixed amount of internal equality that they can invest in the 
project” (Mlinde, 2016: 56). Thus “limited liability upon default means that the lender’s payoff is 
a concave function of the project’s return, while the borrower’s profit is convex" (Rothschild & 
Stiglitz, 1970: 46). The reality of these assumptions is that at any given interest rate, a subset of 
the least risky borrowers will drop out of the market, choosing to forego their projects. By 
implication, “borrower’s limited liability means that he reaps all the project’s gain when its return 
is high but loses his collateral only when the projects return is low” (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970: 
47). For low risk projects, however, the potential upside gains are small. If those “low-risk 
borrowers are pooled with high risk borrowers, they will face higher than warranted interest rates” 
(Qi, 1998: 35).  Low risk borrowers “will increasingly withdraw from the market as interest rate 
rise since they are better off withdrawing drawing from the market and simply consume their 
endowments than agreeing to invest and pay a high interest rate” (Qi, 1998: 205). Thus “increase 
in interest rate cause more good borrowers to drop out of the market, lowering the average 
creditworthiness of the lender’s remaining applicant pool” (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970: 47). This 
means that the “size of adverse selection premium faced by low risk borrowers becomes larger 
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with each interest rate rise because the interest rate must compensate for the default risk of an ever-
worsening pool of borrowers” (Kalua, 2016: 49).  
 
Increase in interest rate therefore affect lenders return in two ways. First it raises lender’s return 
(Kalua, 2016). It also however “lowers average quality of lenders applicant pool thereby lowering 
lenders expected return from any given loan” (Kalua, 2016: 4). Eventually, this secondary adverse 
selection effect may outweigh the first interest rate effect, causing profits to decline as interest rate 
rises. As Kalua (2016: 4) observes further, “once the non-monotonicity of the lenders return in the 
interest rate is established, the possibility of CR follows”. Mlinde (2016: 32) argues that “profit 
maximizing lenders will not voluntarily choose to raise interest rate beyond where the adverse 
selection effect dominate”. If excess demand exists in the market at this rate, CR “will be the 
equilibrium. It should be noted that rationed borrowers are the high risk-borrowers who stay in the 
market and request funding” (Kalua, 2016: 67). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) equally show how CR 
may occur when there is more hazard in the project choice.  
 
CR however has its own limits. Firstly, from the “standing of efficient allocation of capital, an 
important phenomenon is not CR per se but rather the extent to which market fails to allocate 
resources efficiently since there have been moral hazard and adverse selection cases where credit 
is misallocated through non-funding of projects with positive net-present value or funding of 
negative net-present value” (Qi, 1998: 205). Secondly, the use of credit scores and loan-to-value 
ratios now make the lenders more knowledgeable about applicant’s true credit risk, consequently 
limiting the possibility of CR (Kalua, 2016). 
2.4 Literature Review and Analytical Framework 
2.4.1 Agricultural Lending and Agricultural Development 
Inadequate funding is one of the basic challenges now facing the agricultural sector in many 
developing countries. It is in that regard that researchers hold the view that governments in 
developing countries need to address the challenge of inadequate funding toward the agricultural 
sectors especially in rural areas by making credit available to smallholder farmers so as to reduce 
the decline in the agricultural sector. The basic assumption behind this call is that credit plays a 
vital role in the growth of the agricultural sector. The role of the credit in agricultural development 
is presented different by different authors. According to Adeloa and  Fredrck (2016), agriculural 
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credit anables farmers to purchase necessary agricultural inputs needed in growing and expanding 
agricyltural output. Nasir, (2017) found that agricultural credit makes it possible for farmers to 
embark on new investments and adopt now technologies on the farm while Adeola and Fredrick 
argue that credit helps in enabling farmers to finance processing, storage and marketing of the farm 
outputs. In principle, there is an observable linkage between credit and agricultural output. 
Catherine and Boucher (2008) for example examined the effect of credit constrainst on Peruvian 
agriculture and found that credit constraints lowered the valye of agricluture production by 26% 
in the study region. Izhar and Tariq (2009) on the other hand found that lower nstitutional credit 
lowered the aggredgate agricultural output in Inida during the post-reform period of 1992 to 2005. 
Ahmed (2011) arraived at the same conclusion for a study he did on the effect of instistuional 
credit on agricultural proiductivity in Pakisatan between 1974 and 2008 period. In Nigeria, 
Ammani (2012)  examined the relationship between agriclutural output and credit supply. Using a 
simple regression model, he found that formal credit is positively and significantly related to 
agriclutral production (Ammani 2012).  A similar finding was collaborated by Imoisi et al (2012) 
who carried out a appraisal of credit facilities on agricltural output in Nigeria between 1970 and 
2010. Focusing on the effect of commericial banks credit to the agriclutural sector in Nigeria, 
Obilor (2013) found that credit gurantee schemes funds and governement fund allocation to the 
agricultural sector had a siginificant positive effect on agriclutural output while commercial credit 
to the agriclutural sector had a negtaive effect on agricultural productiveity. Using a Cobb-Douglas 
function, Chisasa (2014) investigated the effect of bank credit on agricultural production and found 
that credit had a negative effect on a short run and positive effect on a long run. Salami and 
Arawomo (2013) examined the impact of agricultural credit in Africa by using using panel data 
covering 1990 to 2011 for ten countries across the five sub-regions of the continent. Their findings 
showed that higher savings rates yielded greater agriclutral credit in the continent which in turn 
positively impacted on agrcultural output (Salami and Arawomo, 2013).  Toby and Peterson (2014) 
investgiated the role of bank lending on agriclutural output in Nigeria between 1981 and 2010 and 
found a significant weak corelation between bank lending and agrucltural output. Using an Error 
Correlation Model (ECM), Nnamocha and Charles (2015) examined the effect of bank credit and 
agricultural output in Nigeria  between 1970 and 2013. Their findings revealed that agricultural 
credit has a positive effect on agricultural output in the lon run while industrial output had a postive 
effect in the short-run (Nnamocha & Charles, 2015).  
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However, while different authors converge on the positive impact of credit on agricultural 
development, the exact mode and extent of the impact is a subject of different contestations. While 
some are of the opnion that adequate bank credits to farmers are vital for the deveopment of the 
sector, others are of the view that there are other factors that affect agricultura sector and place less 
empgaisis on the role of bank lending in the development of the agriculturla sector. Another herd 
of researchers put extra emphaisis on the presence of other precondictions as necessary for the 
effect of credit on agricultural output. Stover et al (1985) for example found that the impact of 
agricultural credit on agricultural output in the USA was dependent on  the nature of farm 
management, industrial market conditions, loan purpose (production or marketing), collaterial, 
repayment mode and pricing system of the the yield.  Salami and Arawomo (2013) for on the other 
hand found a positive relationship between aggruclurural output and credit in a scneraio where 
access to land is unhampered.  Khan et al (2015) using time series data for the period 1970 and 
2008 found that agriclutrla credit had a posutive effect agricultural output in Pakistan only with 
availablity of water, inter-cropping, cropping intensification and agricultural labour force.  Osa-
Afana and Kelikume (2015) on the other hand found that agriculture credit had a positive effect 
on agricultural output when accompanied by banking sector reforms. Using  a Vector Auto 
Regressive (VAR) approach, Adeola and Ikpesu (2016) found that agricultral lending had a 
positive effect on agricultural production only in the presence of increased money supply (money 
in circultion) in Nigeria for the period 1981-2003.  
2.4.2 Liquidity Reserve Requirement and Credit Creation 
Farhi et al (2009) observe that immediate historical roots of LRR can be traced to the US national 
banking system between 1863 and 1913. In that period, regional and city banks were subjected to 
different reserve requirements. At that time, the demand for withdrawals fluctuated with the quality 
of crops and was hard to predict (Sprague, 1910). In other words, liquidity shocks were prevalent. 
Consequently, the national baking system experienced several major crises. Sprague (1910) argues 
that crises were mainly due to insufficient amount of aggregate reserves in form of liquid assets 
set aside by the financial system. He argues further that this was reinforced by the practice of 
paying interest on the reserves deposited to the central.  This partly has given rise to the present 
practice of interest free reserves held by the central bank.  
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In the contemporary global practice, LRR is generally reinforced as a form of prudential measure, 
monetary control and liquidity management procedure.  “As a prudential measure, reserves 
provide some protection against both liquidity and solvency risk” (Kalua, 2016: 7). As observed 
by Gray (2011: 3), “this requirement stems back to the gold standard era when ‘commercial banks’ 
ability to take deposits and issue their own banknotes was constrained by a requirement to hold a 
proportionate reserve balance either directly or at another bank (eventually a central bank) which 
in turn held the gold reserves”. On the other hand, as a monetary control measure, reserve 
requirement restricts commercial bank’s balance sheet growth (since reserves cannot be easily 
increased). This is in line with Alper et al (2016) observation that LRR is used as policy tool to 
contain excessive credit growth. In addition, central banks may vary the level of (unremunerated) 
LRR in a way intended to influence the spread between deposit and lending rates in order to impact 
the growth of monetary aggregates and thus inflation (Gray, 2011). Finally, as a liquidity 
management tool, the central bank can (through active channel) “immobilize surplus reserves by 
administrative float so that the impact of a surplus on bank behaviour surplus on bank behaviour 
(low interest rates, demand for foreign exchange) does not in turn lead to inflation or depreciation 
(both of which involve a loss of value for the currency)” (Gray, 2011: 8). Similarly, if demand for 
reserves exceeds supply, the central bank could lower LRR in response. A “passive approach can 
be adopted, if LRR can be met on average over a period: short–term liquidity management by the 
commercial banks is facilitated, with a consequent reduction in short–term interest rate volatility” 
(Gray, 2011: 9). 
 
While the LRR is important parameter for determining the liquidity creation and ultimately total 
credit created, the impact of bank capital on total credit creation is of equal utmost importance. 
The “relationship between capital and liquidity creations are of importance in the field of Banking 
and Finance because liquidity creation signifies the bank's overall ability to effectively serve as a 
financial intermediary” (Berger & Bouwman, 2009: 14).  However, “the relationship between 
capital and liquidity creation has only been a subject of diverse results in terms of the type of 
causality and relationship's sign recently” (Kalua, 2016: 45). Until 2009, literature on the 
relationship between the two variables was scarce and only boomed following the work by Berger 
and Bouwman (2009). Berger and Bouwman (2009) proposed a classification of all balance sheet 
items as either liquid or semi liquid or illiquid. This classification is applied to all items in a bank's 
assets, liabilities, and equity and off-balance-sheet activities 
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Berger and Bouwman (2009) present two hypotheses on the link between bank capital and liquidity 
creation similar to the hypotheses on the link between lending and capital. These are risk 
absorption hypothesis and financial fragility hypotheses. The risk absorption hypothesis “predicts 
that increased capital enhances the ability of banks to create liquidity” (Berger & Bouwman, 
2009:6).This hypothesis stems from two strands of literature concerning the role of banks as risk 
transformers. Liquidity creation increases the bank exposure to risk. By contrast, “more capital 
allows the bank to absorb greater risk” (Berger & Bouwman, 2009:6).  However, the financial 
fragility hypothesis predicts that increased capital hampers liquidity creation (Diamnond & Rajan 
2001). Hovath et al (2012) present a coherent logic of how financial fragility hypothesis. Their 
argument is that “financial fragility effect is an outcome of a process where a bank collects funds 
from depositors and lends them to borrowers” (Hovath et al., 2012:45). Once the loan is issued, 
the bank has to monitor the borrower and collects loan repayment. This process, as argued by 
Hellwig (1994: 1368), “helps the bank obtain private information on its borrowers that gives the 
bank an advantage in assessing their profitability”. However, this information advantage creates 
an agency problem “whereby the bank might be tempted to extract rents from its depositors by 
demanding a greater share of the loan income” (Kishan et al., 2000: 123). Should depositors refuse 
to pay the higher costs, the bank threatens to curtail its monitoring or loan collection efforts. As 
depositors know that the bank might abuse their trust, “they become wary of depositing their 
monitor with the bank” (Hellwig, 1994: 1365). The bank is thus forced to demonstrate its 
commitment to depositors “by adopting a fragile financial structure with a large share of liquid 
deposits” (Hellwig, 1994: 1365). Thus the result of this fragile financial structure is that bank runs 
the risk of losing funding if it attempts to withhold depositors (Hovath et al., 2012). Eventually, 
the threat of bank runs mitigates the holdup problem that arises after depositors have put their 
funds in the bank. Resultantly, “by allowing the bank receive more deposits and finance more 
loans, financial fragility favours liquidity creation” (Kishan et al., 2000: 123). As greater capital 
reduces financial fragility, “it enhances the bargaining power of the bank and hampers the 
credibility of its commitment to the depositors” (Hellwig, 1994: 1365).  Consequently, increased 
capital works to diminish liquidity creation (Hovath et al., 2012).  
 
In general, the studies confirm that higher capital has a negative impact on liquidity creation 
(Horvath, etal., 2012, Berger and Bouwman, 2009, Wiliam et al., 2008). In their 2010 paper, 
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Berger and Bouwman found that monetary policy had an impact on aggregate liquidity creation in 
the US between the period 1984 and 2008 although the impact was found to be large for small 
banks (Berger & Bouwman, 2010). Berger et al., (2012) also found that capital injections in 
German universal banks had a reduced liquidity creation in a similar period. A similar result was 
reported by Rauch et al., (2011) who in trying to compare the influence of macroeconomic factors 
such as tightened monetary policy and other factors found that tightening of monetary policy 
reduces liquidity creation. However, they did not find the effect of bank specific factors such as 
size of the bank on liquidity creation.  The implication of these findings is that there “is a trade-
off between the benefits of financial stability induced by stronger capital requirements as 
championed in Basel II accords and the benefits of greater liquidity creation” (Mlinde, 2016: 81).  
 
Diamond and Rajan (2001) found that bank capital may impede liquidity creation by making the 
banks’ capital structure less fragile. They argue that “fragile capital structures encourage banks to 
commit to monitoring their borrowers and off-balance sheet counterparties, and additional equity 
capital makes it harder for less-fragile banks to commit to monitoring which in turn hampers their 
abilities to create liquidity” (Diamond & Rajan, 2001: 43). Gorton and Winton (2014) on the other 
hand argue that capital also reduce liquidity creation because it crowds out deposits which are an 
important source of liquidity creation. 
 
An alternative view holds that higher capital improves banks’ ability to absorb risk and hence their 
ability to create liquidity. This is so because liquidity creation makes banks less liquid, exposing 
them to liquidity risk, raising the likelihood and severity of losses associated with having to dispose 
of liquid illiquid assets or miss out on lending opportunities to meet customer’s liquid demands 
(Allen & Santomero, 1997). Berger and Bouwman (2009) however, found that the positive 
relationship between capital size and liquidity creation is different between small and big banks 
specifically when off balance sheet activities are included in the liquidity creation measure. 
2.4.3 Bank Liquidity and Lending Levels 
Literature on the effect of LRR on lending levels can be divided into approaches. The first 
approach considers the effect of LRR from banks liquidity perspective while the second approach 
considers the impact from the effect on bank’s capital. 
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In the first approach, three channels through which LRR affects lending levels are cost, interest 
rate risk and liquidity channels. Under cost channel, an increase in reserve requirements affects 
financial intermediation through an implicit tax on the banking system (Fama 1980, Prada 2008). 
These studies suggest that as long as central bank credit and deposits are close substitutes as 
alternative sources of bank funding, higher RR generally produce a fall in deposit interest rates, 
leaving lending rates unchanged. Consequently, the eventual impact of RR on credit and economic 
activity is broadly neutral (Alper et al., 2016). Di Gorgio (1999) argue that in a floating exchange 
rate regime with short term interest rates as the operating target, the liquidity impact of using 
reserve requirements can be negligible because the central bank meets the liquidity needs to 
maintain its interest targets. He argues further tan as short-term interest rate becomes the standard 
operating target for the monetary policy, RR becomes less relevant as a policy tool (Di Giogio, 
1999). Alper et al (2016) confirms this perspective and argues that as bank faced with liquidity 
shock due to a RR hike can compensate the diminished funds without a cost by borrowing from 
the central bank.  Put differently, an increase in RR increases the cost of deposit funding which in 
turn decreases deposit rate. This in turn reduces levels or volumes of deposits. Consequently, this 
stimulates increased central bank funding. In the end, the loan rate remains unchanged and loan 
levels remain unchanged too. Thus from a loanable fund, the effect is neutral as a result of the 
reserve requirement increase. However, as Alper et al., (2016: 2) argue, this thread of argument 
ignores the fact that the bank is “typically obliged to pledge sound collateral to borrow from the 
central bank, especially in emerging economies”. 
 
Alper et al (2016) introduce a liquidity channel which factors in imperfect substitution between 
deposits and central bank funding.  This assumption that deposits and central bank funding are not 
perfect substitutes emanates from the observation central bank funding is collateralized –since the 
swap of deposits with central bank borrowing depletes the liquid assets of the bank. Under these 
premises, a policy-induced changed in the liquidity position of the banking system through a 
change in reserve requirements is seen to alter the bank lending behaviour.  In their analysis of 
Turkey’s banking system, Alper et al (2016) found that a hike in LRR altered balanced sheet of a 
bank. Since the bank cannot cut down its loan commitment immediately, additional funding is 
needed to be fulfilled by borrowing from the central bank which requires pledging a collateral. In 
the end the banking systems liquidity positions deteriorates prompting some banks to tighten their 
lending due to liquidity concerns (Aper et al., 2016).  Orr and Mellon (1961), observe that this 
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outcome is relevant for emerging and developing countries where all interbank funding is 
collateralized and government bonds are the main source of collateral. A bank with low liquidity 
buffers may run into collateral constraints rather easily which is particularly undesirable during 
turbulent times. However, as commented by Alper et al (2016), even from a reputation cost 
perspective, liquidity positions matter for the bank lending behavior even during normal times.  In 
terms of pattern and trend, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) observe that in the early stages of 
quantitative tightening (liquidity reserve hike), the decline in bank liquidity is associated with 
relatively stable bank loans. This is so because the contractual nature of bank loans makes it 
difficult to adjust or respond quickly. At a “consequent stage, banks are left with less liquid buffers 
to use against unexpected liquid shocks” (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992: 98). The marginal cost of 
borrowing from the central bank thus increases “as the banks take into account the additional 
liquidity risk which in turn leads to higher lending rates or a reduction in the pace of credit growth” 
(Bernanke & Blinder, 1992: 98)  
 
The third channel is the interest rate risk channel. Through this channel, “a hike in reserve 
requirement increases interest rate risk which in turn stimulates a hike in deposit rate and loan rate 
consequently” (Alper et al., 2016: 24).  In the end, loan levels go down. (Alper et al., 2016).  
 
As earlier indicated, other literature threads analyses the role of bank liquidity in lending from the 
angle of the role of liquidity on the positive impact of capital on lending. According to this strand 
of literature, “an effect of bank capital on lending will only exhibit an upward slope depending on 
liquidity level” (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992: 98)   Put differently, “banks with greater liquid value 
of assets will supply more lending following an increase in capital than banks with lesser value of 
liquid assets” (Kim & Sohn, 2017: 45). It is argued that “until they acquire sufficient liquid assets, 
banks with a lesser value of liquid assets are likely to invest more resources in liquid assets than 
in supplying loans when capital increases” (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992: 98). This appears to be 
consistent with other studies that equally observed that less liquid banks are likely to reduce loans 
to maintain their liquid assets holdings above some dangerously low level (Cornett et al., 2011; 
Berrospide, 2013).  
 
The relationship between liquidity, capital and lending is largely explained by two strand of 
theories namely the "financial fragility crowding out" and "risk absorption".  The financial fragility 
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crowding out theory predicts that “the effect of bank capital on lending is negative because unlike 
depositors, capital investors who cannot run on the bank are reluctant to provide loans” Bernanke 
& Blinder, 1992: 10). Implicitly, banks with a higher capital ratio might supply fewer loans by 
crowding out deposits (Kim & Sohn, 2017). Conversely, as further observed by Kim and Sohn 
(2017:46), “the effect of bank capital on lending is positive under the risk-absorption theory 
because the bank capital enhances bank risk-bearing capacity”. However, in their observation, the 
financial fragility “crowding out effect dominates the risk-absorption effect when banks have 
insufficient liquid assets and vice versa because capital investors are likely to become more 
reluctant to provide loans when banks possess inadequate liquid assets and when an increase in 
bank capital alone cannot boost banks' risk-bearing capacity sufficiently" (Kim & Sohn, 2017: 98). 
 
Kim and Sohn (2017) however qualifies the impact of liquidity on capital size's impact on lending 
by introducing another variable - the size of the bank. In their study Kim and Sohn (2017: 99) finds 
that for “large banks the effect of an increase in bank capital ratio on credit growth, defined as 
growth rate of net loans on the balance sheet plus unused commitments represented on the balance 
sheet, is positively associated with the level of bank liquidity ratio”. This finding implies that the 
“effect of an increase in capital ratio on credit growth is significantly negative for low liquidity 
ratio and that it becomes significantly positive as large banks retain sufficient liquid assets” 
(Bernanke & Blinder, 1992: 99) For small and medium banks this interaction was found to be non-
sufficient or negligibly negative. Dohan and Wook (2017) admits that bank capital and lending 
exhibit a complicated relationship as opposed to a linear one. 
However, although the impact of liquidity on lending behavior is treated as significant in several 
literature sources, the added impact of capital on lending behavior of bans needs full cognizance. 
Until late 1990s, “much focus was on the effect of reserve requirement on demand deposits with 
no significant attention paid to the impact of bank capital on lending behaviour” (Dohan & Wook, 
2017: 12). It was only in 2000 that the focus shifted to the effect of bank capital on lending channel 
(Ashcraft 2001, Jayratne & Morgan 2000; Kisahan and Opiela, 2000). However, earlier empirical 
investigations concerning the effect of bank capital on lending mostly referred to the US banking 
systems (Furfine, 2000; Hancock et al., 1995; Kishan & Opiela, 2000). The main finding of this 
strand of literature is that “bank capital increase the capacity of raise uninsured forms of debt and 
therefore banks' ability to limit the effect of a drop in deposits on lending” (Furfine, 2000: 234). 
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The capacity of banks “to substitute uninsured for insured liabilities depends on the amount of 
excess capital, as it is a proxy for banks' default risk” (Dohan & Wook, 2017: 12). 
 
Some other papers have also tried to analyse different mechanisms of how bank capital affect 
lending behavior (Bolton & Freixas, 2001: Thakor 1996). In these papers, a regulatory capital 
requirement is explicitly taken into account unlike in first strand of papers. As Gombacorta and 
Mastrulli (2004:437) put it, "given that the regulatory requirement depends on the amount of loans 
granted, a link between capital and lending is established with the additional assumption that banks 
face an imperfect market for their equities". Van den Heuvel (2001:12) argue that this is done in 
what he calls a "bank capital channel" based on the “maturity mismatch between assets and 
liabilities which exposes banks to interest rate risk”. Consequently, “a monetary tightening lowers 
banks’ profits and consequently their capital accumulation” (Van den Heuvel, 2001: 124).The 
bank capital channel is based on three assumptions: Firstly, there is always an “imperfect market 
for bank equity: banks cannot easily issue new equity because of the presence of agency costs and 
tax disadvantages” (Calomiris & Hubbard, 1999: 12). If it is too costly to issue new shares, banks 
could reduce lending in order to meet regulatory capital requirements. Gombacorta and Mastrulli 
(2004: 231) found that “well capitalized banks can better shield their lending from monetary policy 
shocks as they have easier access to uninsured fund raising”. Secondly, “banks are subjected to 
interest rate risk because their assets typically have a longer maturity than liability” (Calomiris & 
Hubbard, 1999: 12). Thirdly, banks have to meet regulatory capital requirements linked to credit 
supply (Thakor, 1996; Bolton & Freixas, 2001). Based on these three assumptions, it is argued that 
after an increase in market interest rates, a smaller fraction of loans can be renegotiated compared 
with deposits. This means that “interest rates on bank assets are slower to adjust to changes in 
market interest rates than those on banks liabilities” (Thakor, 1996: 31). Consequently, “banks 
bear a loss due the maturity mismatch between assets and banks' liabilities that reduces profits and 
then capital” (Dohan & Wook, 2017: 12).  If equity is “sufficiently low and it is too costly to issue 
new shares, banks reduce lending or else they fail to meet regulatory capital requirements” (Bolton 
& Freixas, 2001: 242). Van den Heuvel (2001: 12) argues that even if “capital is greater than 
regulatory capital requirements, low capitalized banks may optimally forgo lending opportunities 
now in order to lower the risk of capital inadequacy in the future”.  In a study that focused on the 
impact of capital levels on lending behavior of Italian banks, Gombacorta and Mastrulli (2004:449) 
found that one percent increase in the monetary policy capital requirement leads to a decline of 
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around 1.2 percent for the average bank in terms of lending. In Indonesia, Poczeter (2016: 132) 
found that “increased bank capitalization following the Asian financial crisis increased lending by 
3.6 million Indonesian Rupiah and a net increase in bank risk of 40 percent implying that increased 
capitalization increases risk taking by the banks”. 
 
Farhi et al  (2009) observed the impact of LRR on lending levels by observing its effect on interest 
rate. They concluded that LRR “had both a positive and negative impact on interest rates although 
it largely reduced the space for arbitrage (difference between interest charged and received by 
banks)” (Farhi et al., 2009: 23). 
2.4.4 Liquidity Reserve Requirement and Agricultural Lending Levels 
Financial intermediaries, especially banks play a vital role in pooling of savings and extension of 
credit or lending to several sectors including agriculture. While the link between LRR and lending 
levels is treated as obvious in the dearth of literature, several authors have concluded that factors 
that affect agricultural lending in Africa go beyond bank liquidity.  In Sub-Saharan region, the 
“occurrence of lending for agriculture is well below the share of the sector as a percentage of GDP” 
(Mlinde, 2016: 18).  In Malawi, only less than 12 percent of lending goes to agriculture, even 
though it accounts for around 30 percent of GDP and being the highest contributor to the GDP.  
Commercial banks and microfinance institutions “consider lending to the agricultural sector as a 
risky investment and prefers to lend to non-farm sectors” (Mlinde, 2016: 23).   
A number of hypothesis from a banking and finance point of view have been put forward as to 
why lending to agriculture is low in the sub-Saharan region. Betubiza and Leatham (1995: 42) for 
example observe that “competition for loanable funds has an effect on the cost and availability of 
loan funds to agricultural borrowers”. In their view, borrowing costs go up as lenders attempt to 
transfer some of these higher costs incurred in acquiring funds to borrowers. In the processes loan 
“funds to agricultural borrowers may be curtailed as banks seek to match their interest rate 
sensitive liabilities with interest rate sensitive non-loan assets” (Betubiza & Leatham, 1995: 43). 
Banks might increase security requirements or decrease the term of the loan. In addition, banks 
might also opt to increase the supervision of the loans to increase performance. However, 
“considering that supervision is costly to the bank, loans may only be extended to those borrowers 
with a more than usual likelihood of repayment, thus excluding many agriculture borrowers” 
(Betubiza & Leatham, 1995: 43). 
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Besides the need to match interest sensitive liabilities to interests’ sensitive non-loan assets, there 
are also other factors that explain general low lending towards agriculture by the banks. First, the 
“nature of competition faced by the banks in a certain vicinity will determine lending levels 
towards agriculture” (Zhao, et al., 2008:34). It is argued that “competition affect investment 
decisions and that banks will always allocate less money towards agriculture relative to others 
assets in areas where production credit associations or corporative are active” (Kalua, 2016: 43). 
Thus the number of alternative credit associations will always have an effect on lending behavior 
of banks towards agriculture. Besides competition, the locality of banks has also been observed to 
have an impact on the magnitude of lending towards agriculture. It is argued that “urban banks 
have more diverse clients and therefore have more flexibility in moving in and out of agriculture” 
(Betubiza & Leatham, 1995: 46)). This is in contrast to rural banks which are so dependent on 
agriculture and are more likely going to lend towards agriculture. Swings in that can be triggered 
by sudden changes in local farming economic conditions can affect lending levels. The level of 
farm profitability and mechanization has also been concluded to positively affect lending levels 
by banks. Adeyinka et al (2015: 35) found that “limited manpower resources for the banks to 
monitor and control lending in the agriculture sector is one such a cardinal challenge”. Finally, 
land ownership if “properly defined and registered act as collateral needed to secure bank loans 
towards agriculture sector unlike in a scenario where land system is communal” (Zhao, et al., 2008: 
71).  
 
However, the specific association between liquidity reserve requirement and lending seem to 
emanate largely from interest rate effects. Benjamin (undated: 20) found that “rising market 
interests rates affect the liquidity of rural banks (which mostly lend towards agriculture) by 
limiting their flexibility in adjusting security portfolios to meet loan demand”. A rural banks’ 
lending capacity is largely governed in the long run by its ability to attract deposits (Benjamin, 
undated). But it can fund fast loan growth in short run by liquidating securities. However, even so, 
as Benjamin (undated: 20) observes “rising rates of interest complicate this procedure in since on 
one hand, market rates tend to rise faster than rates from farm loans, with the result that short-run 
profit incentives for banks shift form loans to other investments while on the other hand rising 
interest cause prices of fixed-rate instruments in a bank’s investment portfolio to decline”. Under 
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all this conditions, the bank is likely to lose on security transactions if it liquates an investment so 
it can fund loan requests. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In contextualizing the locus of this study in literature, an understanding of the role of banks in 
lending processes was deemed necessary. Theory of Financial Intermediation and its amended 
version were discussed to understand the reasons for existence of commercial banks. Despite its 
usefulness, Financial Intermediation Theory was considered weak due to its overreliance on 
neoclassical concept of perfect competition.  The amended version of the theory focused on risk 
taking, management and diversification role of the banks in the intermediation process. With 
regard to why banks decide to or not to lend, bank liquidity reserve requirement and credit 
rationing theories were used. The former argued that bank hold cash requirements for prudential 
regulation thereby barring potential lenders while the later argues that there will always be a 
situation where lenders will be unwilling to advance additional funds to borrowers even at a higher 
interest rate.  
Empirically, different authors agree that credit has a positive impact on agricultural development. 
However, liquidity reserve requirement is often used as a prudential measure, monetary control 
and liquidity management procedure. There is a negative relationship in literature between bank 
capital levels and liquidity creation. The direct effect of liquidity level on lending behaviour of 
banks however is dependent on a number of factors such as bank size and deposits growth. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design, methods, tools and sources of data.  Building on chapter 
2, it specifically presents how data was documented, processed and analysed.  It also provides   
limitations of the study. 
3.2 Research Design 
The study used a quantitative research paradigm since the focus was on understanding the causal 
relationship premised on the hypotheses. In terms of research methods used, “quantitative research 
paradigms advocate for quantitative methods in both data collection and analysis” (Becker & 
Byrman, 2004: 36). They include experimental research, survey research using structured 
questionnaires with closed-ended questions, and statistical analyses among others (Becker & 
Bryman, 2004). In contrast, “those who adopt qualitative research designs make use of qualitative 
research methods such as participant and non-participant observations, field interviews (formal 
and/or informal) using open-ended semi-structured or unstructured questions, and case studies” 
(Becker & Bryman, 2004: 36).  Thus in this study, a quantitative design was followed for purposes 
of understanding the purported relationship of several variables provided in the first chapter.  
3.3 Data Sources, Type and Sample Size 
The research was conducted using secondary data from Reserve Bank of Malawi (Central Bank) 
and Commercial Banks in Malawi. Data from the balance sheets that the banks report to Reserve 
Bank of Malawi was used for analysis. During time of the study, Malawi had a total of nine 
registered commercial banks namely; CDH Investment Bank, ECO Bank, FDH Bank, First Capital 
Bank, National Bank of Malawi, NBS Bank, NED Bank, Standard Bank Malawi and New Finance 
Bank Malawi. The data was collected for six commercial banks (77% of the commercial banks) in 
Malawi namely National Bank of Malawi (NBM), Standard Bank of Malawi, FDH Bank, NED 
Bank, FMB Bank and NBS Bank where only four commercial banks are listed on Malawi Stock 
Exchange.  The six banks were selected based on three parameters. Firstly, their combined market 
share is 95% while their total asset share is 96% (RBM, 2017). Secondly, they are the only banks 
that were operating within the opted period of between 2007 and 2017 as others became operation 
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few years after 2007.  Thirdly, the six banks had traceable and consistent availability of data for 
the period in question.   
3.4 Analytical Framework 
To test the relationship between liquidity and lending the Malawian Banking sector, the study 
adopted the panel regression framework due to the cross-sectional and time series nature of the 
sample. Equation 1 specifies the relationship between liquidity reserve requirements (LRR) and 
total liquidity creation 
 
𝑇𝐿𝐶(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐵𝐶(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾2𝐵𝐷𝐺(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾3𝐿𝐷𝑅(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾4𝐵𝑆(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾5𝐿𝑅𝑅 + 𝜖(𝑖,𝑡) 
Equation (1)  
The regression equation to test the effect of Liquidity on Lending Levels in Malawi are presented 
in equations 2 and 3. 
𝐴𝐿𝐿(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝐿𝐶(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼3𝐵𝐶(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼4𝐵𝐷𝐺(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼5𝐿𝐷𝑅(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼6𝐵𝑆(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
Equation (2) 
𝑇𝐶(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝐿𝐶(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼3𝐵𝐶(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼4𝐵𝐷𝐺(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼5𝐿𝐷𝑅(𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼6𝐵𝑆(𝑖,𝑡) +  𝜖(𝑖,𝑡) 
Equation (3) 
Where  
ALL is Agriculture Lending Levels measured as the ratio of agricultural loans and advances to the 
total loans and advances to all sectors (total credit), TC is  Total Credit which is the ratio of total 
loans and advances to total assets; BS is Bank size measured by total assets, BC is Bank Capital 
measured by total equity minus liquidity reserve requirement, BDG is Bank Deposit Growth rate 
measured as the annual rate of change in total deposit levels by customer, LDR is Lending to 
Deposit ratio measured as level of total lending or credit as portion of total deposit; 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 and  𝜂𝑖,𝑡, 
are error terms 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖  are coefficients 𝜄 and 𝑡 is Bank name and year respectively.  
 
3.5 Definition and Measurement of Variables 
This section discusses the measurement of the variables in the regression equation.  
3.5.1 Dependent Variables:  
3.5.1.1Total Credit (TC) and Agriculture Lending Levels (ALL) 
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Total Credit implies the sum of advances and loans granted to all the sectors in Malawi. In 
principle, it denotes the level of support towards the private sector and consequently the strength 
of the capital market. Ideally, “the sectorial lending is supposed to roughly match the level each 
sector’s contribution towards the GDP” (Hellwig, 1994: 1364). As indicated in literature, TC is 
dependent on a number of factors such as GDP growth rate, population growth and bank specific 
features discussed in the subsequent sections. However, LRR is considered as one of the key 
determining factor. On the other hand, Agricultural Lending Levels (ALL) is a portion of total 
lending towards the agriculture sector  - regardless of smallholder or large scale farming  
(Diamond, 1997). It includes total lending towards crop production, animal production as well as 
fisheries, bee-keeping and aquaculture. It does not include trading and any value addition or micro-
processing since these have their own categories.  Agriculture lending levels generally depend on 
total credit levels although the response of agriculture lending levels to changes in total credit 
differs with the response of others sectors due to the presence of specific factors that affect the 
agriculture sector only (Montoro & Moreno, 2011). 
 
3.5.2 Independent Variables 
3.5.2.1 Liquidity Reserve Requirement (LRR) 
In Malawi, according to RBM Liquidity Reserve Directive of  2015,  LRR is used for monetary 
policy and as a tool for flexibility in liquidity management (RBM, 2015). RBM’s LRR ratio of 
7.5% applies on daily basis with a minimum of US$ 200,000.00 on foreign currency equivalent in 
Malawi Kwacha. The banks maintain their requires reserves fortnights which include total deposits 
liabilities, government deposits, repurchase agreements, foreign currency deposits and other 
liabilities.  Although from a theoretical and practical perspective LRR reduces bank runs, there has 
been a vigorous debate about the negative impact of liquidity regulation on liquidity creation due 
to its impact on bank lending to the non-financial economy and bank profitability. As observed by 
Bernejee and Mio (2014: 119), “financial industry groups have argued that liquidity regulation 
will substantially increase the cost of bank funding and damage the real economy as banks pass on 
higher costs and reduce credit supply to the real economy”. Some authors have however not found 
any evidence that tightening of LRR has an impact on the overall size of bank balance sheets or a 
detrimental impact on lending to the non-financial sector either through reduced lending supply or 
higher interest rates on loans (Li et al., 2017, Bernejee & Mo, 2014).  Others authors found that 
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banks subjected to the LRR adjusted the size of their balance sheets to meet tighter liquidity 
regulation (Bernejee & Mo, 2014) while others found that some banks alter the composition of 
both their assets and liabilities (Wierts & Wierts, 2016) 
 
3.5.3.2 Total liquidity Creation (TLC) 
 
Total Liquidity Creation (TLC) was measured in three-stage approach of Berger and Bouman 
(2009).  In phase one, “classification of all bank balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities as 
liquid, semi-liquid or illiquid was made while phase two assigned weights to the activities 
classified in phase one” (Berger & Bouman, 2009: 13).  In phase three, combination of the 
activities “as classified in phase one and as weighted in phase two in different ways to construct 
four liquidity creation measures, ‘cat fat,’ ‘mat fat,’ ‘cat nonfat,’ and ‘mat nonfat’ was made 
(Berger & Bouman, 2009: 13).   
 
In the second phase of liquidity creation weights are assigned to all the items in line with financial 
intermediation theory. The theory stipulates that “banks create liquidity by transforming illiquid 
assets into liquid liabilities hence a positive weight is allocated to these balance sheets while 
negative weights are allocated to liquid assets, illiquid liabilities and capital on assumption that 
liquidity is destroyed if illiquidity liabilities are used to finance liquid assets” (Berger & Bouman, 
2009: 14).  Thus the equation below illustrates how the liquidity creation is calculated in the third 
stage.   
 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
= (1 2⁄ × 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 0 × 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖 − 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
− 1 2⁄ × 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
+ (1 2⁄ × 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 0 × 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑖 − 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
− 1 2⁄ × 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) −
1
2⁄ × 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  
  
Equation (4) 
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According to equation (4) above, the measure of liquidity creation was based on category 
classification of balance sheet items and maturity classes. This method gave liquidity measure for 
all six commercial individual banks included in this study.   
 
The transmission from LRR to bank lending behaviour and levels basically considers three 
channels, namely cost, and interest rate risk and liquidity channels. Under cost channel, “an 
increase in reserve requirements affects financial intermediation through an implicit tax on the 
banking system” (Fama, 1980:40, Prada, 2008). These studies suggest that as “long as central bank 
credit and deposits are close substitutes as alternative sources of bank funding, higher RR generally 
produce a fall in deposit interest rates, leaving lending rates unchanged” (Prada, 2008: 81). 
Consequently, the eventual impact of RR on credit and economic activity is broadly neutral (Alper 
et al., 2016).  Alper et al (2016) introduce a liquidity channel “through which a policy-induced 
change in the liquidity position of the banking system through a change in reserve requirements is 
seen to alter the bank lending behaviour” (Kishan et al., 2000: 122).  The third channel is the 
interest rate risk channel. Through this channel, a “hike in reserve requirement increases interest 
rate risk which in turn stimulates a hike in deposit rate and loan rate consequently” (Kishan et al., 
2000: 122) . In the end, loan levels go down (Alper et al., 2016).  
3.5.4 Control Variables 
 
Literature confirms that lending levels are significantly influenced by a variety of factors, ranging 
from bank capital, bank asset growth, bank deposit growth and loan to deposit ratio.  It was 
therefore imperative that these firm specific variables should be controlled.  
3.5.4.1 Bank Capital Level 
 
A capital requirement is a standardized requirement that the Central Bank places for commercial 
banks “that determines how much liquid is required to be held for a certain level of assets” (Mlinde, 
2016: 45). In principle, changes in bank capital materializes into a wide range of possible outcomes 
on lending (Gombacorta & Mistrulli, 2004). On one hand, this capital regulatory agenda by the 
Central Banks imposes a significant cost to commercial banks “because the excess capital is a 
liquid asset reserved than required, therefore incurs a cost of interest” (Kishan, et al., 2000: 130). 
Moreover, this regulation is widely perceived by banks as hindering their ability to support credit 
growth. Alternatively, a “well-capitalized bank or a bank with access to additional sources of 
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capital will be able to accommodate capital losses without reducing its assets - and hence it’s 
lending” (Gombacorta & Mistrulli, 2004:58). As such, “high capital levels ensure that commercial 
banks have enough capital to sustain operating loses without tampering with the credit, hence 
illustrating a positive outcome towards the lending” (Kishan et al., 2000: 122). 
 
3.5.4.2 Bank Size 
 
Literature confirms that total assets of a bank reflect bank size (BS). Larger banks “tend to have 
more diverse lending opportunities, but also more opportunities to raise deposit funds for lending 
to more sectors” such agriculture (Gombacorta & Mistrulli, 2004: 15). However, increased bank 
size could lead to more urbanization of banks. As observed by Gombacorta and Misrulli (2004: 
16), large banks may be likely to reduce the agricultural lending “because they use more 
centralized lending procedures without local bank personnel in the lending decision”. 
3.5.4.3 Bank Deposit Growth 
 
The most vital operation of commercial banks is to mobilize deposits (cash in demand deposits) to 
finance their credit creation role (advances loans on credit to customers). Deposit growth (DG) 
rate for each commercial bank “reflects the changes in an availability of loanable funds in a bank” 
(Kishan et al., 2000: 122). Loanable fund is “the sum total of money that commercial banks have 
decided to lend out to customers as an investment” (Nam et al., 2007: 34).  Since a bank can have 
more funds to invest when it has high deposit growth rate, this rate is likely to have a positive 
impact on the loan growth. Deposit growth rate “has a positive impact on lending because it 
increases freedom for the commercial banks to tap when planning to invest” (Stover et al, 2001: 
81). The higher “growth in loans is related with the higher deposit growth rate” (Nam et al, 2007: 
35). This implies that more funds are available to lend to customers. 
3.5.4.4 Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) 
 
Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) is the “tool of assessing bank's liquidity by comparing a bank's total loans 
to its total deposits for a specific same period” (Stover et al., 2001: 81).  Similarly, it is a proxy for the 
liquidity of the bank and the potential funds available for loan growth. Nam et al., (2007: 34) found that 
“banks with high loan to deposit levels are limited in the amount of funds available for additional lending”. 
Banks with “high and low growth in agricultural loans are not able to increase additional lending to 
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agriculture hence negatively affecting the lending to the agriculture sector” (Mlinde, 2016: 31)). Table 5 
below summarizes how these variables were measured. 
Table 5 : Definition of Variables 
 VARIABLE SYMBOL MEASUREMENT                                         EXPECTED 
SIGN 
SOURCE OF 
DATA  
Liquidity Reserve 
Requirement  
LRR RBM Reserve Ratios + Reserve Bank of 
Malawi Reports 
Total Liquidity 
Creation 
TLC  Liquidity Creation Approach  +/- Commercial 
Bank reports 
Total Credit TC Sum of all sectors lending to 
total assets ratio 
+ Commercial 
Bank’s Report  
Agriculture 
Lending Levels 
ALL Sum of Agricultural sector 
lending to all sector lending 
ratio 
+ Commercial 
Bank Reports  
Bank Capital Level BC Total sum of equity minus 
reserve requirement to total 
assets 
+/- Commercial 
Bank Reports  
Bank Deposit 
Growth 
BDG Rate of growth in annual 
deposits by customers 
+/- Commercial 
Bank Report 
Bank Size BS Natural logarithm of Total 
Assets  
+ Commercial 
Bank Reports 
Loan to Deposit 
Ratio  
LDR Total loans as a portion of total 
deposits 
+ Commercial 
Bank’s Report 
 
Source: Author’s own summary from different literature sources 
3.6 Estimation Approach  
3.6.1 Random Effect (REM) and Fixed Effect Model (FEM)  
As observed by Oscar (2007:40), “with panel or cross sectional time series data, the most 
commonly estimated models are probably fixed effects and random effects models”. Population 
averaged models and mixed effects models are also sometime used. As observed by Wooldridge 
(2010:34) “several considerations affect the choice between a fixed effect model (FEM) and a 
random effect model (REM)”. The nature of “omitted variables in the model affect the choice of 
either FEM or REM” (Osacr, 2007: 42). If there are “no omitted variables or if the omitted 
variables are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables that are in the model, then REM is 
probably the best” (Williams, 2018). It will produce “unbiased estimates of the coefficients, use 
all the data available, and produce the smallest standard errors” (Oscar, 2007: 45).  If there are 
omitted variables, and “these variables are correlated with the variables in the model, then FEM 
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provides a means for controlling for omitted variable bias” (Clark et al., 2010: 12). In a FEM, 
subjects serve as their own controls. The assumption is “that whatever effects the omitted variables 
have on the subject at one time, they will also have the same effect at a later time; hence their 
effects will be constant, or ‘fixed’ (Oscar, 2007: 47).  
 
As commented by Nwakay and Ijoma (2007:62) “if subjects change little, or not at all, across time, 
FEM may not work very well or even at all”. There needs to be “within-subject variability in the 
variables if subjects are to be used as their own controls” (Oscar, 2007: 50). If there is little 
variability within subjects, then the standard errors from FEM may be too large to tolerate. 
Conversely, REM will often have smaller standard errors. However, “the trade-off is that their 
coefficients are more likely to be biased” (Clark et al., 2010: 43).  
 
In FEM, the unobserved variables are allowed to “have any associations whatsoever with the 
observed variables” (Cameron & Pravin, 2005). FEM control for the effects of time-invariant 
variables with time-invariant effects. Oscar (2007: 35) confirms that “this is true whether the 
variable is explicitly measured or not”. Exactly how they do so vary by the statistical technique 
being used. In REM, “the unobserved variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with (or, more 
strongly, statistically independent of) all the observed variables” (Williams, 2018:4). REM can be 
estimated via Generalized Least Squares (GLS). To decide between fixed or random affects 
Hausman test is run “where the null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects versus 
the alternative, the fixed effects” (Oscar, 2007: 59). It basically tests “whether the unique errors 
are correlated with the regressors - the null hypothesis is they are not” (Williams, 2018: 54).  
 
3.7  Limitations of the Study 
The key limitation of the study is the time frame under which the sampled banks’ lending 
behaviour was used for analysis. There are only six banks that have been consistently operating or 
present. This leaves out three more banks that started operating midway through the opted period. 
Furthermore, amongst the six banks sampled, three are dominant in terms of asset size as compared 
to the other three. Furthermore, literature confirms the effect of other co-founding factors such as 
human capital, GDP growth rate, inflation and openness of economy on agriculture lending levels 
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among other factors. Consequently, the generalization of this study on the effect of liquidity on 
agricultural lending levels should be cautious of these other factors.   
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented and justified the methodology that was used in data collection and analysis. 
The study used quantitative design in understanding the purported relationship of several variables 
provided in the first chapter. Data was collected on six commercial banks largely due to the 
continued presence in the data period. The study used panel regression analytical framework due 
to the cross-sectional and time series nature of the sample. There were six control variables namely 
bank capital, bank assets growth, bank deposit growth and loan to deposit ratio. The estimation 
approach combined the fixed effects and random effects models.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
10 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction  
The section on empirical analysis is divided into four sections. The first section presents a summary 
of descriptive statistics. Thereafter, in line with the objectives of the study, results of an estimation 
of the liquidity creation will be presented to be followed by Hausman Test with the aim of selecting 
the appropriate panel data model for the study.  The final section presents a summary of results 
according to the objectives.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the selected variables are presented in Table 6. The mean value of 0.182 
for agriculture lending levels (ALL) indicates that approximately 18.2% lending was advanced to 
the agricultural sector. The total credit (TC) advanced to all sectors averaged 41% of total banks’ 
assets over the study period. The maximum TC over the period has been 77.3% (of total banks 
assets) while the minimum was 7.2%.  Loans as portion of total deposit had mean of 0.529, 
representing about 53% of the total deposits.    
Table 6 : Descriptive Statistics 
 TC ALL TLC LRR BS BDG BC LDR 
Mean 0.411 0.182 0.012 0.134 4.836 0.844 0.149 0.529 
Minimum 0.072 0.025 -0.286 0.075 4.016 0.456 0.033 0.099 
Maximum 0.773 0.589 0.359 0.178 5.641 2.208 0.285 1.067 
Skewness (Pearson) -0.275 1.161 0.210 -0.791 0.107 2.687 0.228 -0.293 
Kurtosis (Pearson) -0.112 1.647 -0.838 -1.219 -0.661 6.694 -0.004 -0.415 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.315 0.000 0.326 < 0.0001 0.399 < 0.0001 0.905 0.051 
Anderson-Darling 0.119 0.003 0.235 < 0.0001 0.707 < 0.0001 0.760 0.017 
Jarque-Bera 0.688 < 0.0001 0.352 0.009 0.563 < 0.0001 0.782 0.542 
Note: TC=Total Credit; ALL= Agriculture Lending Levels; LRR=Liquidity Reserve Requirement; TLC=Total Liquidity Creation; BS=Bank Size; 
BC=Bank Capital Level; BDG=Bank Deposit Growth; LDR= Loan to Deposit Ratio. Values in bold are different from 0 with a significance level 
alpha=0.05. Source: Authors Own Computation 
 
 
Liquidity reserve requirement (LRR) for the period under review as directed by monetary policy 
committee (MPC), had an average mean value of 0.134 with 0.075, 0.178 as minimum and 
maximum respectively. On average, total liquidity created in the industry accounted for 1.2% of 
total industry assets. The mean of BDG, LDR and BC were 0.844, 0.529, 0.411 and 0.149 
respectively. For all variables expect BS (which was a natural log of total assets), BDG had highest 
mean value while TLC had the lowest value.  
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4.3 Correlation Coefficient  
In determining whether or not linear relationship exists between the variables employed in this 
study, Pearson correlation coefficient test was considered. The test also measured possibility of 
multicollinearity within the variables. The presence of multicollinearity affects coefficients test of 
the multiple regression. As shown by Table 7 below, there was generally a strong relationship 
amongst all the variables except for TLC and LDR. The results show that BS had a strong 
correlation with BC, BGD, TC, ALL and LRR with weak relationship with TLC and LDR. Out of 
the variables that BS had a strong correlation with, its relationship with BDG and LRR was 
negative.  BS and LRR had a negative relationship although it was a strong relationship. TCL on 
the hand had a weak relationship with all the variables although there was a weaker positive 
relationship with, BS, ALL and LRR.  BC had strong linear relationship with all variables except 
for TLC and LDR.  Equally TC had a strong relationship with all variables except TLC and LDR. 
ALL had a strong positive relationship with BS, BC and TC. It had a negative strong relationship 
with LRR partly confirming literature on the negative relationship between ALL and LRR. The 
relationship between ALL and TLC was observantly weak although positive (implying some small 
contribution of TLC towards ALL). Similarly, ALL’s relationship with BDG and LDR was weak 
and negative). LDR   only showed a strong negative relationship with BDG. LRR was strongly 
correlated with BS, BC, TC and ALL although negatively.  
Table 7 : Pearson Correlation Coefficient Test Results Table 
 
BS TLC BC BDG TC ALL LDR LRR 
BS 1 0.094 0.951 -0.291 0.842 0.338 -0.142 -0.648 
TLC 0.094 1 -0.030 -0.066 -0.238 0.207 -0.191 0.063 
BC 0.951 -0.030 1 -0.273 0.873 0.368 -0.087 -0.548 
BDG -0.291 -0.066 -0.273 1 -0.282 -0.190 -0.508 0.128 
TC 0.842 -0.238 0.873 -0.282 1 0.313 0.187 -0.584 
ALL 0.338 0.207 0.368 -0.190 0.313 1 -0.113 -0.308 
LDR -0.142 -0.191 -0.087 -0.508 0.187 -0.113 1 0.246 
LRR -0.648 0.063 -0.548 0.128 -0.584 -0.308 0.246 1 
Note: LRR=Liquidity Reserve Requirement; TLC=Total Liquidity Creation; TC=Total Credit; ALL= Agriculture Lending Levels; 
BC=Bank Capital Level; BS=Bank Size; BDG=Bank Deposit Growth; LDR= Loan to Deposit Ratio. Values in bold are different 
from 0 with a significance level alpha=0.05. Source: Author’s Own Computation 
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4.4 Total Liquidity Creation 
According to banking theory, banks exist because they create liquidity and transform risk. 
Interestingly, just as elsewhere banks create only about half of their liquidity on the balance sheet, 
highlighting the importance of off-balance sheet liquidity creation as considered in this study.  
Standard Bank registered positive LC for the period under consideration as compared to other 
banks.  NBS on the other hand registered negative LC for the entire period except for the years 
2015 and 2016 as shown by Figure 3 below. In general, Table 6 confirms that, calculated as a 
portion of total banking industry assets, there was positive TLC (mean of 0.012 or 1.2% of total 
assets) while TLC in absolute figures under Figure 3 was below zero except for 2011, 2012 and 
2013.  
 
Figure 3 : Trend of Liquidity Creation by Banks 
 
 
Source: Authors Own Depiction Banks Balance Sheets and RBM 
4.5 Hausman Test Results Summary 
Hausman test was used for choosing between models in panel data for this study.  As Oscar (2007: 
98) puts it, “Hausman test examines the presence of indigeneity in the panel model”.  It is one of 
the tests used to determine an appropriate model choice (Williams, 2018). The test specifies 
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whether fixed or random effects panel model should be used. Null (𝐻0 ) and alternative hypotheses 
(𝐻1) were defined.  The null hypothesis was that appropriate model is random effects (RE). This 
means “there is no correlation between the error term and the independent variables in the panel 
data mode” (Clark et al., 2010: 61). The alternative hypothesis was that appropriate model is fixed 
effects (FE). This means that “there is correlation between error term and the independent variables 
in the panel data model” (Williams, 2018: 65).  
 
In panel model used in this study individual effects terms can be modelled as either random or 
fixed effect. If the individual effects are “correlated with the other explanatory variables in the 
model, random effect model is inconsistent while fixed effect model is consistent” (Oscar, 2007: 
67). Similarly, if the “individual effects are not correlated with other explanatory variables in the 
model, both models are consistent and random effects is efficient” (Cameron & Pravin, 2005: 43). 
Both random and fixed effects estimates are “close when both are consistent and not close or 
distance when random effect is inconsistent” (Williams, 2018: 65). The Hausman test is based on 
this distance (Oscar, 2007). If the distance is large, the 𝐻0 “that individual effect are uncorrected 
with other regressors (random effects preferred) is rejected” (Williams, 2018: 34). Conversely, “if 
the distance is small, 𝐻0  is not rejected and random effect is preferred as it is more efficient” 
(Clark et al., 2010: 45).  As shown by Table 8 below,   𝐻0 was rejected for Equation 1 (Model 1 
BC) and Equation 3 (Model 2 BS) as P-Values were 0.0004 and 0.0323 respectively which are less 
than 0.005 with large test statistics of 20.61 and 12.19 respectively.   This implies that fixed effect 
model was preferred over random effect model in this analysis for Equation 1 (Model 1 BC) and 
Equation 3 (Model 2 BS).  For Equation 1 (Model 2 BS), Equation 2 (Model 1 BC), Equation 2 
(Model 2 BS) and Equation 3 (Model 1 BC), the 𝐻0 was not rejected as P-values were greater than 
0.005 with smaller test statistic. This implies that the random effect model was preferred over fixed 
effect model on Equation 1 (Model 2 BS), Equation 2 (Model 1 BC), Equation 2 (Model 2 BS) 
and Equation 3 (Model 1 BC). 
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Table 8 : Summary of Hausman Test Results for Selected Model 
Equations Models Null Hypothesis   𝝌𝟐 Prob>𝝌𝟐 Decision  
Equation 1 
Model 1 (BC) Reject 20.61 0.0004*** Fixed Effect Model 
Model 2 (BS) Do not reject  9.45 0.0509 Random Effect Model  
Equation 2 
Model 1 (BC) Do not reject 4.90 0.4288 Random Effect Model 
Model 2 (BS) Do not reject  4.15 0.5280 Random Effect Model  
Equation 3 
Model 1 (BC) Do not reject 10.53 0.0615 Random Effect Model 
Model 2 (BS) Reject  12.19 0.0323*** Fixed Effect Model  
Source: Own Summary from Computation 
4.6 Impact of Liquidity Reserve Requirement on Total Liquidity Creation 
As shown in the Table 7 above, BC and BS are perfectly linearly correlated with 0.951.  In order 
to mitigate influence of collinearity between these two variables BC and BS were fitted separately 
within the same model as demonstrated above. In order to understand the effect of LRR on TLC, 
The Equation 1 (FEM BC and REM BS) were fitted. FEM BC Model was significant at 1% and 
explains 28.17% variations in TLC. Explicitly, when Reserve Bank of Malawi through Monetary 
Policy Committee directs to raise LRR, TLC is affected.  
 
As shown by Table 9, a positive relationship was observed between LRR and TCL (0.701) which 
indicates that an increase in LRR stimulated an increase in TLC. Specifically, a one-unit increase 
in LRR stimulated 0.70149 increase in TLC with p-value 0.08 and standard error of 0.392 which 
was significant at 10%. This is inconsistent with Alper et al (2016) who found that an increase in 
LRR reduces TLC.    Part of the reason for this occurrence could be that banks adjusted the size of 
their balance sheets to meet tighter regulation while others may have just altered the composition 
of both assets and liabilities as theoretically commented by Bernejee and Mo (2014) and  Wierts  
& Wierts, 2016. All coefficients of the model were insignificant except for bank capital (BC) 
which was observed to be significant and negative at 1% significant. This indicates that increases 
in bank capital reduces liquidity creation in the Malawian banking industry and support the 
‘financial-fragility crowding hypothesis’ (Berger & Bouman, 2009). The theory argues that bank 
capital reduces the crises and eliminates the need to create liquidity.  
 
For REM (BS), the model was observed to be insignificant at 1% and only explained 7.9% 
variations in TLC. However, just as in with FEM (BC) one unit increase in LRR stimulated 0.779 
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increase in TLC with P-value of 0.231 and standard error of 0.643. All variables were insignificant 
at 1% and 5% expect for BDG at 10%.  This implies that holding all factors constant, LRR affectd 
TLC positively with an attendant positive BDG. In summary, holding all factors constant, LRR 
positively stimulated an increase in TLC with BC and BDG important attendant variables although 
they pulled in different directions. 
 
Table 9 : Fixed Effect and Random Effect Models: Equation 1 
Dependent Variable: Total Liquidity Creation (TLC) ratio 
 Model 1 (FEM)  Model 2 (REM) 
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. Prob>t  Coefficient Std. Err. Prob>z 
LRR 0.70149 0.39236 0.08*  .7708765 .64334 0.231 
BC -1.409495 .3810599 0.001***     
BS     -.01743 .07028 0.804 
BDG -0.0625 0.06567 0.346  -.13403 .07299 0.066* 
LDR 0.0226 0.09305 0.809  -.13636 .10496 0.194 
Constant 0.16917 0.08903 0.064*  0.32219 0.50505 0.527 
F(4,47) 4.6    5.19   
Prob>F 0.0032    0.2685   
R-squared  0.2817    0.0793   
Banks  6    6   
Observation 57    57   
Note: LRR=Liquidity Reserve Requirement; BS=Bank Size; BC=Bank Capital Level; BDG=Bank Deposit Growth; 
LDR= Loan to Deposit Ratio. *** denotes significance at 1% * denotes significance at 10%. Author’s Own 
Computation  
 
4.7 Impact of Liquidity on Agriculture Lending Levels  
In order to understand effect of liquidity (TLC and LRR) on ALL, two models were fitted using 
random effect model according to Hausman test conducted above on Equation 2.  In Model 1 
(REM- BC), the model was significant at 1% and explains 21.9% variation in ALL. As shown by 
Table 10, the coefficient of liquidity creation (TLC) was positive and significantly related to 
agriculture lending (ALL) at 1%. This indicates that one unit increase in TLC increases ALL by 
0.3052 with a standard error of 0.111. This suggest liquidity creation enhances agriculture lending 
by banks in Malawi. The same observation was made in Model 2 (REM-BS), where a unit increase 
in TLC positively affected ALL by 0.2989 with a standard error of 0.111. However, when all 
factors are held constant, the coefficient of the liquidity reserve requirement (LRR) was observed 
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to be negative and significant at 1% in Model 1 (REM-BC).  This indicates that increasing liquidity 
reserve requirements reduces lending to the agriculture sector in Malawi which is consistent with 
interest rate risk and liquidity channels argument of Alper et al (2016).  This could partly be 
attributed to the fact that banks reduce lending agriculture which is considered risk due to its 
dependency on climate or due to other agricultural landscape’s specific features for Malawi. The 
result is congruent to observations by Betubiza and Leatham (1995) where LRR was seen to 
negatively affect ALL. 
Table 10 : Results of Random Effect Model: Equation 2 
Dependent Variable: Agriculture Lending Levels (ALL)  
 Model 1 (REM)  Model 2 (REM) 
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. Prob>z  Coefficient Std. Err. Prob>z 
LRR -1.27048 0.45156 0.005***  -0.77981 0.53836 0.147 
TLC 0.305242 0.11106 0.006***  0.298949 0.11164 0.007*** 
BC 0.429941 0.3087 0.164     
BS     0.065776 0.05313 0.216 
BDG -0.02042 0.06123 0.739  0.003971 0.06837 0.954 
LDR 0.014334 0.09507 0.88  0.017238 0.0958 0.857 
Constant 0.25821 0.09706 0.008***  -0.0834 0.34111 0.807 
Wald (6) 𝝌𝟐 19.4    18.85 
  
Prob> 𝝌𝟐 0.0016    0.002 
  
R-squared 0.2199    0.195 
  
Banks 6    6 
  
Observations  57    57 
  
Note: LRR=Liquidity Reserve Requirement; TLC=Total Liquidity Creation; BS=Bank Size; BC=Bank Capital Level; 
BDG=Bank Deposit Growth; LDR= Loan to Deposit Ratio; * and *** denotes significance at 10% and 1% respectively.    
 
Source: Author’s Own Computation 
4.8 Total Credit Determinants 
In order to further understand determinants of TC, random effect and fixed effect models were 
fitted based on Hausman test results shown in Table 8 before using Equation 3. REM (BC) and 
FEM (BS) were fitted.  As shown by Table 11, REM (BC) model was significant at 1% and 
explains 81.4% variations in TC.  The positive determinants of TC were LRR, BDG and LDR with 
unit increase in LRR, BDG, and LDR affecting a positive increase in TC by 0.0202, 0.21779, and 
0.70164 with the standard errors of 0.23758, 0.03222 and 0.05002 respectively. However, only 
BDG and LDR were significant at 1%. It can however be observed that TLC and BC negatively 
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affected TC but were insignificant. Thus interestingly, it can be implied that an increase in TLC 
does not automatically translate into an increase in TC.  
 
In Model 2 (REM-BS) model was significant at 1% and explains 82.99% variations in TC.  Similar 
to Model 1, only bank deposit growth (BDG) and loan to deposit ratio (LDR) were observed to 
have significant positive effect of total credit (TC). This indicates that increases in deposit 
mobilization and intermediation enhance the credit creation ability and consistent with Stover et 
al (2001).  
Table 11 : Results of Random and Fixed Effect Models: Equation 3 
Dependent variables:  Total Credit (TC) 
 Model 1 (REM)  Model 2 (FEM) 
Variables Coefficient Std. Err. Prob >z  Coefficient Std. Err. Prob >t 
LRR 0.0202 0.23758 0.932  -.35905 .37049 0.338 
TLC -0.0749 0.05843 0.200  -.04569 .07247 0.532 
BC -0.2167 0.16241 0.182     
BS     -.03674 .04242 0.391 
BDG 0.21779 0.03222 0.0001***  .27313 .03721 0.000*** 
LDR 0.70164 0.05002 0.0001***  .69332 .05214 0.000*** 
Constant  -0.11368 0.05107 0.026  .03968 .25202 0.876 
Wald (6) 𝝌𝟐  300.8    288.83 
  
Prob> 𝝌𝟐 0.0001    0.0001 
  
R-squared 0.814    0.8299 
  
Banks 6    6 
  
Observations  57    57 
  
 Note: LRR=Liquidity Reserve Requirement; TLC=Total Liquidity Creation; BC=Bank Capital Level; BDG=Bank Deposit 
Growth; LDR= Loan to Deposit Ratio BS=Bank Size: *** denotes significance at 1%.  Source: Author’s Own Computation 
 
4.9 Conclusion  
In general, using Pearson correction test, BS and BC had perfect linear relationship. On the other 
hand LRR and ALL had a significant negative relationship with each other. With regard to liquidity 
formation, only Standard Bank registered positive or increased liquidity creation in absolute 
figures for the entire period. However, as a ratio of total banks assets industry, there was a positive 
liquidity creation of an average of 1.2% (of total banking sector assets) for the period under review. 
With regard to impact of liquidity reserve requirement on total liquidity creation, a positive 
interaction effect was observed. The findings further show that total liquidity levels had positive 
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effect on agriculture lending levels.  However, in a scenario where LRR went up, Agriculture ALL 
went down  implying  that banks shifted to other sectors considered less risky even though liquidity 
went up. In general, Total Credit was determined by Bank Deposit Growth and Loan Deposit 
Ration while Liquidity Reserve Requirement, Total Liquidity Creation and Bank Creation affected 
Total Credit negatively. This could imply that an increase in Total Liquidity Creation did  not 
automatically result into an increase of Total Credit.  Liquidity Reserve Requirement affected 
Total Credit negatively just as it affects Agriculture Lending Levels negatively. A caution however 
should be observed on the role of Standard Bank and National Bank of Malawi which as seen in 
the Figure 4 had higher influence.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Following the regressions’ outcomes and analysis of results outlined in the preceding chapter, this 
Chapter seeks to present a summary of study findings in line with the study's objectives. It draws 
implications and tentative generalisations on the impact of liquidity on agriculture lending in 
Malawi. General recommendations along the major finds they relate to Development Finance in 
general and agricultural lending in particular are also provided.  
5.2 Summary of Findings 
The study estimated the Total Liquidity Creation among a sample of banks in Malawi from 2007 
to 2017. In addition, it also examined the impact of Liquidity Reserve Requirement (LRR) on Total 
Liquidity Creation (TLC) and impact of liquidity on Agricultural Lending Levels (ALL) and Total 
Credit (TC). Key conclusions were drawn from the empirical analysis. On the overall, in absolute 
figures, the liquidity levels declined in the period under consideration except for some three years. 
However, when liquidity was interpreted as a portion of total banking sector assets, there was a 
1.2% liquidity created for the period under review. With regard to the impact of LRR on TLC, the 
results show that LRR positively affected TLC. The other important variable however was BDG 
which also affected TLC positively. BC on the other hand had a negative effect on TLC. 
Furthermore, total liquidity positively affected ALL. There was however some negative effect of 
LRR on ALL. Thus although LRR affect TLC positively, it did not stimulate ALL, suggesting the 
likelihood that banks shifted to less risky sectors (in terms of lending) even though on the overall 
liquidity went up due to a rise in LRR. Finally, TC was positively determined by BDG and LDR 
while LRR, TLC and BC negatively affected TC. This could imply that an increase in TLC does 
not automatically result into an increase in Total Credit.  
5.3 Policy Recommendations 
Drawing on literature and the study’s empirical findings, a number of policy implications can be 
reflected upon specifically around the role of LRR on liquidity creation, the role of Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) in Malawi and the need for alternative financing mechanisms towards 
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the agriculture sector.  
 
With regard to the role of LRR, although this study did not examine the role of financial institutions 
in economic growth for Malawi, their indirect role through liquidity creation needs to be well 
appreciated and stimulated by the wider macroeconomic actors especially the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi. It is well known that the development of the banking sector promote economic growth 
through different variables, liquidity creation being one of them. For the Central Bank to stimulate 
liquidity creation, two immediate factors can be considered. Firstly, the level of liquidity growth 
was positively related to Liquidity Reserve Requirement. This means that an increase in LRR 
induced liquidity growth. However, Bank Capital has a negative effect on TLC which could 
mitigate the positive effect of LRR. Since this means that larger banks creates less liquidity than 
small banks as equally observed by Gombacorta and Mistrulli (2004), the Basel II and III stringent 
bank capital requirement cannot be ignored.  In this regard, the Reserve Bank of Malawi should 
be careful against setting LRR and Bank Capital requirement levels beyond some levels. These 
two should be carefully reflected upon in any attempt to stimulate liquidity creation.  
 
Secondly, although the absolute number of commercial banks is not that low (nine in total), there 
is high dominance by three banks. Deliberate measures to attract additional participants in the 
banking sector for increased liquidity creation would be one of the practical strategies.  
 
Besides LRR’s role on liquidity creation, the study also found that an increase in liquidity levels 
positively affected an increase ALL.  The caution here is on concentration levels, specifically with 
regard to the sectors within the agricultural (smallholder or large-scale farmers) which experience 
a higher stimulation by the increase in liquidity level. However, general reflections on Malawi can 
be made. Given the fact bank credit extended to private sector has a long term effect on economic 
growth, any increase in liquidity level is of ultimate importance for Malawi which has registered 
an average growth rate of four percent in the past 10 years. However, since liquidity levels are 
used as a form of prudential measure, monetary control and liquidity management procedure, the 
role of (MPC) in Malawi comes into play.    
 
While the TLC is an important parameter for determining ALL, the impact of factors that affect 
TLC as discussed above namely BC and LRR should be of priority importance by the MPC. 
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Considering that studies confirm that higher capital has a negative impact on liquidity creation 
(Horvath, et.al, 2012, Berger and Bouwman, 2009, Wiliam et al., 2008), the MPC needs to 
carefully examine the right LRR and Bank capital target so that TLC impact on ALL is not offset 
by BC.  
  
However, since the stimulation of ALL in Malawi and elsewhere is done alongside careful 
consideration of controlling inflation, the Bank Rate or Policy Rate on other hand, has been a 
critical aspect of the monetary policy in the recent years. The Bank Rate is the rate of interest at 
which Reserve Bank of Malawi advances loans to the commercial banks in the country. In case of 
inflation, the Central Bank increases the bank rate to which commercial banks have to increase the 
interest rate. As Kalua (2016: 45) puts it, “due to increase in interest rate, demand for the loans to 
commercial bank reduces and the money supply in the country shrinks”. In this way, inflation is 
controlled. 
  
Alternatively, “bank rate is reduced in case of depression which results in the reduction of interest 
rate and the money supply in the country is increased” (Kalua, 2016: 76). Managing the bank rate 
has been a method by which the Central Bank affected economic activity significantly. The 
dramatic fall of bank rate from 24% to 16% in 2017 was expected to make substantial impact on 
the economic growth rate of Malawi. This is so because “lower bank rates help to expand an 
economy by lowering the cost of funds for borrowers” (Mlinde, 2016: 67). In a nutshell, the ability 
of TLC to stimulate ALL expansion needs to be considered alongside the role of Monetary Policy 
Committee in the control of inflation (through Bank Rate) and liquidity creation (through bank 
capital size requirements). 
 
As seen in the preceding chapter, while LRR positively affected LCL which in turn positively 
affected ALL, LRR on its own negatively affected ALL.  Put differently, increased LRR in this 
study has proven to be one of the factors that inhibits bank lending levels to the agriculture sector. 
In Malawi, agricultural loans are regarded as “non-performing loans because they are characterized 
by inefficiencies which have resulted in low return and poor financial performance” (Mlinde, 
2016: 23).  
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However, high non-performing loans on the balance sheet of Malawi’s banks could explain the 
weak credit delivery that exists in most African countries for fear of banks’ credit risking due to 
high LRR met by the banks. The issue of non-performing loans over agriculture lending levels 
could “also largely be due to the limited capacity of banks in Malawi to monitor and efficiently 
assess the risk of their loan clients” (AICC, 2016: 45). Thus it is important that LRR as a stimulus 
to agriculture lending levels is administered and considered alongside other factors. Some of the 
other factors have been listed under literature review. However, those of practical relevance for 
Malawi include the nature of farm management, industrial market conditions, loan purpose 
(production or marketing), collaterial, repayment mode and pricing system of the agricultural 
yield.  Other factors include land tenure system or property rights system as well as availablity of 
water, inter-cropping, cropping intensification, availability of skilled agricultural labour force and 
general positive reforms in  the banking sector.  
 
Finally, the study observed that BDG and LDR positively determined TC. Interestingly TC was 
negatively affected by TLC implying that an increase in TLC does not automatically translate into 
TC. As earlier discussed, TC does not also automatically translate into ALL. This means that ALL 
should not be left to the whims of TLC and TC alone as stimulants. Banks have their own lending 
preferences depending on perceived risks associated with different sectors. In this regard, 
exploration and trial of alternative agricultural financing section by the government and other 
stakeholders is of cardinal importance as long as the options supplement and not replace or distort 
the normal lending dynamics to the agriculture sector. The need for pursuance of alternative 
financing options to the agriculture sector can be advocated for on the premises that the financing 
levels are still low despite the observable increase over the years.  
 
Furthermore, the impediments that stand in the way of bank lending to sector such as property 
rights, land ownership, farmer group strengths and low agro-industrialization levels are still there. 
In the presence of these impediments, funding towards the sector needs to be supplemented by 
other financing options such as Warehouse Receipt System (WRS), contract farming and out-
grower schemes need to be scaled-up.  
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